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SUMMARY  TABLE 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
OUTPUT 
(Real Annual Growth %) 
     
Private Consumer Expenditure 6.6 6.2 7.8 4.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 4.6 4.1 5.5 3.5 
Private Investment 12.8 3.9 3.7 2.6 
Exports 3.9 4.9 6.0 5.2 
Imports 6.5 5.3 6.9 5.5 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 5.5 6.0 4.9 3.7 
Gross National Product (GNP) 5.3 7.4 4.8 3.7 
GNP per capita (constant prices) 3.1 4.7 2.7 2.2 
      
PRICES 
(Annual Growth %)       
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 2.5 4.0 4.9 3.0 
Wage Growth 5.6 5.0 5.5 5.0 
      
LABOUR MARKET       
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,952 2,039 2,097 2,122 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 89 93 103 111 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 4.4 4.4 4.7 5.0 
      
PUBLIC FINANCE       
Exchequer Balance (€m) -500 2,265 -622 -1,057 
General Government Balance (€m) 1,623 5,031 2,132 2,489 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) 1.0 2.9 1.1 1.2 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 27.4 25.1 23.7 22.8 
  
EXTERNAL TRADE       
Balance of Payments Current Account (€m) -4,200 -5,737 -7,856 -9,026 
Current Account (% of GNP) -3.1 -3.8 -4.9 -5.3 
  
EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATES (end of 
year)      
US$/€ Exchange Rate 1.24 1.25 1.34 1.35 
STG£/€ Exchange Rate  0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 
Main ECB Interest Rate  2.25 3.50 4.25  
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SUMMARY 
According to the preliminary estimates contained in the Quarterly National Accounts 
for December 2006, real GNP grew by 7.4 per cent last year. The corresponding 
figure for real GDP was 6 per cent. These figures imply that the economy continued 
to perform very strongly last year and are consistent with other positive outcomes. 
For example, 87,000 extra jobs were created in 2006 and the Exchequer recorded a 
surplus of over €2 billion. 
For 2007, we anticipate a moderation in the pace of economic growth. We expect 
the volume of GNP to grow by 4.8 per cent, with the volume of GDP to grow by 
4.9 per cent. In 2008, we foresee a continuation of the easing in economic growth. 
Our forecast for real GNP growth next year is 3.7 per cent; our forecast for real 
GDP growth is also 3.7 per cent. 
A large part of the reason for the higher rate of growth in 2006 relative to 2007 
was a high rate of stock building in 2006, which added 1 per cent to the growth 
figure. The other main component was a higher rate of residential construction in 
2006 relative to what is expected for 2007. Following a record number of 
completions in 2006 (over 93,000 units), we expect this figure to fall to 82,000 units 
this year. The slowdown in house building will continue into 2008, when we expect 
76,000 units to be completed. This fall in house building, combined with a post-
SSIA slowdown in consumption growth, lead to our lower growth forecast for 2008. 
The slower pace of economic growth in 2007 and 2008 will be mirrored in, for 
example, the labour market and the public finances. We anticipate the rate of 
unemployment to increase to 4.7 per cent in 2007 and to 5 per cent in 2008. The 
large Exchequer surplus in 2006 (mentioned above) is expected to become a deficit 
of over €600 million in 2007 and of €1 billion in 2008. 
CPI inflation is projected to average 4.9 per cent in 2007 and 3 per cent in 2008. 
This is partly based on the expectation of a further interest rate rise in September of 
this year. Thereafter, we have adopted a technical assumption of no further rate 
rises, although we stress that this is an assumption. Clearly, should further rate rises 
occur, our CPI forecast for 2008 will need to be adjusted upwards. 
The growing importance of services exports relative to merchandise exports is 
highlighted in a discussion of Ireland’s recent export performance. In the General 
Assessment, we discuss the potential difficulties that could arise if the current high rate 
of CPI inflation feeds into wage demands. We also discuss how the economy is now 
on a transition path as the boom in house building eases. We conclude that the 
scope for policy aimed at facilitating a smooth transition away from house building 
and towards other activities is limited in the short term. However, wage flexibility 
should ensure that the economy is insulated from the worst effects of the slowdown 
in house building.  
 
 
  
FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2006 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
 2005 2006 Change in 2006 
       
  Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
          
Private Consumer Expenditure 74,114 80,799 6,685 4,614 9.0 2.6 6.2 
Public Net Current Expenditure 22,952 25,128 2,176 947 9.5 5.1 4.1 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 43,582 47,959 4,377 1,704 10.0 5.9 3.9 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 131,001 140,147 9,146 6,456 7.0 2.0 4.9 
Physical Changes in Stocks 98 2,022 1,924 916    
    
Final Demand 
271,746 296,055 24,309
15,34
4 8.9 3.1 5.6 
less:    
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 110,553 120,229 9,676 5,880 8.8 3.3 5.3 
less:    
Statistical Discrepancy 30 32 2 -187    
    
GDP at Market Prices 161,163 175,794 14,631 9,650 9.1 2.9 6.0 
less:    
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,248 -25,513 -265 328 1.0 2.4 -1.3 
    
GNP at Market Prices 
135,914 150,281 14,367
10,01
4 10.6 3.0 7.4 
B:  Gross National Product by Origin 
 2005 2006 Change in 2006 
     
  Forecast   
 €m €m €m %
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,399 3,450 51 1.5
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 65,272 71,706 6,434 9.9
 Other: 57,380 60,925 3,545 6.2
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -578 -200   
 Statistical   
    Discrepancy 30 32   
 
Net Domestic Product 125,503 135,913 10,410 8.3
less: 
Net Factor Payments -25,248 -25,513 -265 1.0
 
National Income 100,254 110,400 10,146 10.1
Depreciation 16,896 17,962 1,066 6.3
 
GNP at Factor Cost 117,150 128,362 11,212 9.6
Taxes less Subsidies 18,764 21,919 3,155 16.8
 
GNP at Market Prices 135,914 150,281 14,367 10.6
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 2005 2006 Change in 
2006 
    
  Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 20,447 19,918 -529 
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,248 -25,513 -265 
Net Transfers 601 -142 -743 
    
Balance on Current Account -4,200 -5,737 -1,537 
as % of GNP -3.1 -3.8 -0.7 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2007 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
     
 Forecast Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expend Private 
Consumer Expenditure 80,799 89,673 8,874 6,262 11.0 3.0 7.8 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25,128 28,143 3,015 1,382 12.0 6.2 5.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 47,959 50,496 2,537 1,764 5.3 1.6 3.7 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 140,147 150,325 10,178 8,462 7.3 1.2 6.0 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2,022 910 -1,112 -1,112    
    
Final Demand 296,055 319,547 23,492 16,988 7.9 2.1 5.7 
less:    
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 120,229 130,733 10,504 8,286 8.7 1.7 6.9 
less:    
Statistical Discrepancy 32 32 0 0    
    
GDP at Market Prices 175,794 188,782 12,988 8,702 7.4 2.3 4.9 
less:    
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,513 -27,498 -1,985 -1,519 7.8 1.7 6.0 
    
GNP at Market Prices 150,281 161,284 11,003 7,177 7.3 2.4 4.8 
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
     
 Forecast Forecast   
 €m €m €m %
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,450 3,536 86 2.5
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 71,706 77,965 6,259 8.7
 Other: 60,925 63,976 3,051 5.0
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -200 -200   
 Statistical   
    Discrepancy 32 32   
   
Net Domestic Product 135,913 145,309 9,396 6.9
less:   
Net Factor Payments -25,513 -27,498 -1,985 7.8
   
National Income 110,400 117,811 7,411 6.7
Depreciation 17,962 19,211 1,249 7.0
   
GNP at Factor Cost 128,362 137,022 8,660 6.7
Taxes less Subsidies 21,919 24,262 2,343 10.7
   
GNP at Market Prices 150,281 161,284 11,003 7.3
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
    
 Forecast Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 19,918 19,592 -326 
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,513 -27,498 -1,985 
Net Transfers -142 50 192 
 
   
Balance on Current Account -5,737 -7,856 -2,119 
as % of GNP -4 -5 -1.1 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2008 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
     
 Preliminary Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 89,673 95,582 5,909 4,035 6.6 2.0 4.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28,143 30,676 2,533 985 9.0 5.3 3.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 50,496 53,577 3,081 1,324 6.1 3.4 2.6 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 150,325 160,518 10,193 7,838 6.8 1.5 5.2 
Physical Changes in Stocks 910 728 -182 0    
    
Final Demand 319,547 341,082 21,535 14,130 6.7 2.2 4.4 
less:    
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 130,733 140,527 9,794 7,155 7.5 1.9 5.5 
less:    
Statistical Discrepancy 32 32 0 12    
    
GDP at Market Prices 188,782 200,522 11,741 6,962 6.2 2.4 3.7 
less:    
Net Factor Payments (F) -27,498 -29,067 -1,569 -1,023 5.7 1.9 3.7 
    
GNP at Market Prices 161,284 171,455 10,172 5,939 6.3 2.5 3.7 
B:  Gross National Product by Origin 
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
     
 Preliminary Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,536 3,625 88 2.5 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 77,965 82,954 4,989 6.4 
 Other: 63,976 67,451 3,475 5.4 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -200 -200  
 Statistical   
    Discrepancy 32 32  
     
Net Domestic Product 145,309 153,861 8,552 5.9 
less:    
Net Factor Payments -27,498 -29,067 -1,569 5.7 
    
National Income 117,811 124,794 6,983 5.9 
Depreciation 19,211 20,349 1,139 5.9 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 137,022 145,143 8,122 5.9 
Taxes less Subsidies 24,262 26,312 2,050 8.4 
    
GNP at Market Prices 161,284 171,455 10,172 6.3 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
 2007 2008 Change in 2008
    
  Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 19,592 19,991 399 
Net Factor Payments (F) -27,498 -29,067 -1,569 
Net Transfers 50 50 0 
    
Balance on Current Account -7,856 -9,026 -1,170 
as % of GNP -4.9 -5.3 -0.4 
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 The main developments of note are as follows: The 
International 
Economy 
• Growth in the Euro Area will remain strong in 2007 and 
2008, with growth rates expected to be 2.7 per cent and 2.3 
per cent respectively; 
• Growth in Germany underpins the Euro Area figures, with 
growth of 2.9 per cent expected in 2007, followed by growth 
of 2.2 per cent in 2008; 
• This strong performance in the Euro Area relative to recent 
years implies that the international environment is 
particularly favourable to Ireland at present; 
• The strong pace of economic expansion will result in at least 
one more increase in interest rates in 2007; 
• Fears of a recession in the US are receding, with little 
evidence that the contraction in housing activity has had 
major spillovers to elsewhere in the economy. 
Euro Area 
The Euro Area continues to perform strongly and the recovery that 
began in 2006 is expected to be maintained into 2008. Growth in 
2006 was 2.8 per cent and is expected to be 2.7 per cent in 2007 and 
2.3 per cent in 2008. The improved performance is being reflected in 
the labour market, with unemployment falling to close to 7 per cent, 
the lowest level in fifteen years. This improvement is contributing to 
increased growth in consumer spending, with growth rates of 2 per 
cent and 2.3 per cent forecast for 2007 and 2008 respectively. These 
figures represent a considerable improvement on the 2004 and 2005 
consumption growth rates of 1.5 per cent and 1.6 per cent 
respectively. 
Continued growth at the rates currently being experienced leads 
to increased concerns over the inflationary outlook. Following a 
number of years of wage restraint, the tightening in the labour 
market could lead to increased wage demands. More generally, 
continued growth implies a reduction in spare capacity and hence the 
potential for rising price levels. Strong growth in the money supply 
has also been observed, again with possible implications for price 
levels. These trends are clearly influencing the thinking of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) with regard to its interest rate 
strategy. Having increased rates once again in early June, the ECB 
President continued to describe rates as being “on the 
accommodative side”, thereby suggesting the possibility remains of 
further rate rises. Most commentators appear to believe that a further 
25 basis points rise in September is likely and we have factored this 
into our analysis. Thereafter the situation becomes difficult to 
forecast and we have chosen to adopt a technical assumption of no 
further rate rises through 2008. 
Turning to individual economies within the Euro Area, 
Germany’s recent strong performance underpins that of the Euro 
Area generally. Growth in 2006 is now estimated to have been 3 per 
cent, a remarkable rebound from the 2004 and 2005 growth rates of 
0.8 per cent and 1.1 per cent respectively. Exports grew by 12.9 per 
cent in 2006 and are expected to grow by 9.4 per cent in 2007. When 
combined with high investment growth rates in both 2006 and 2007 
5 
 (6.4 per cent and 4.9 per cent respectively), the export/investment 
story behind German growth in 2006 and 2007 is clear. Looking 
forward to 2008, there is an expectation that consumption will also 
grow at a healthier pace. 
France is growing at a slower pace relative to Germany, although 
the volatility of its growth path is lower also. Real GDP growth is 
estimated to have been 2.1 per cent in 2006 and is forecast to be 2.2 
per cent in each of 2007 and 2008. Part of the reason for the slower 
pace of growth in France relative to Germany is that French exports 
are growing at just half the rate of German exports. This, in turn, 
may be related to a divergence in competitiveness between the two 
largest Euro Area economies. Growth in compensation per employee 
in France averaged 3.5 per cent per annum between 2004 and 2006; 
the corresponding figure for Germany was 0.4 per cent.1  
Italy, like Germany, also rebounded in 2006 with growth rising to 
1.9 per cent, following a dismal performance in 2005 when growth 
was just above zero (0.2 per cent). Part of Italy’s improved 
performance was related to that of Germany, as Italian exports to 
Germany grew. Italian exports in general rose by 5.5 per cent in 
2006, well ahead of the other components of demand. In 2007 and 
2008, this strong export performance is expected to continue and will 
contribute to real GDP growth rates of 2 per cent in 2007 and 1.7 
per cent in 2008.  
 
Figure 1: Interest Rates 
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United Kingdom 
Real GDP is estimated to have grown by 2.8 per cent in the United 
Kingdom (UK) in 2006. Similar growth rates are forecast for 2007 
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1 A comparison of wage trends in Ireland relative to elsewhere is provided in the 
Incomes section below. 
 
 and 2008 (2.7 per cent for 2007 and 2.5 per cent for 2008). 
Investment grew strongly in 2006, at a rate of 6.5 per cent, and is 
expected to continue to do so in 2007 and 2008, with growth rates of 
7.6 per cent and 5.3 per cent forecast.  
Although immigration has acted to dampen wage pressures in the 
UK economy, concerns over the inflationary outlook have led the 
Bank of England to continue with a series of interest rate increases. 
Consumer prices inflation reached 3.1 per cent in March. Although it 
is expected that inflation will ease in the coming months, the 
possibility remains that wage negotiations will be influenced by the 
spike in inflation (if the recent high level is indeed a spike). For this 
reason, it is thought likely that the Bank of England will remain 
mindful of the need to anchor inflation expectations and hence the 
possibility exists of further interest rate rises. In this way, the UK is 
part of a group of countries/regions where monetary tightening is 
happening (for example, the Euro Area, Japan and New Zealand). 
Figure 2: Exchange Rates 
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United States 
Following a number of years of economic growth in excess of 3 per 
cent, the United States is currently experiencing a slower rate of 
growth. For the year 2007, the OECD expects real GDP growth of 
2.1 per cent, significantly lower than the 2006 figure of 3.3 per cent. 
The reason for the slowdown is a dramatic reduction in house 
building activity, with residential investment expected to fall by 16 
per cent in 2007. 
When the decline in housing activity began in 2006, concerns 
arose that there would be spillovers to other sectors of the economy 
through, for example, employment falls and hence falls in consumer 
spending. To date, such concerns have generally not been realised. 
The labour market continues to perform strongly, with 
unemployment falling to 4.4 per cent in March 2007, its lowest level 
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in four years. Partly in response to the strong labour market, 
consumption has remained strong and is expected to grow by just 
over 3 per cent in 2007. 
This apparent resilien
using construction leads the OECD to forecast a higher rate of 
growth in 2008 relative to 2007 (2.5 per cent versus 2.1 per cent). 
The fall in housing construction is expected to level off, whereby 
investment will again make a positive contribution to growth. 
An important implication of the US recovery is that it has
increasing expectation of interest rates being left unchanged by 
the Federal Reserve for the remainder of 2007. Until recently, there 
had been a view that the slowing of the economy would prompt the 
Fed into lowering rates. The recovery, and ongoing concerns over 
inflationary pressures, has reduced the chances of any rate cut in 
2007. 
The Ja
GDP grew by 2.2 per cent in 2006 and is expected to grow by 2.4 per 
cent and 2.1 per cent in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Export growth 
has been particularly strong, with a growth rate of 9.5 per cent 
recorded in 2006. This contributed to the Japanese current account 
surplus reaching almost 4 per cent of GDP in 2006. Although the 
recovery is now well established, price inflation has not taken hold 
and prices are actually falling according to a number of measures. In 
this context, it is somewhat surprising that the Bank of Japan has 
raised interest rates as recently as February and financial markets 
expect further rises by early 2008. 
India and China continue to gr
6, China grew by 10.7 per cent and similar rates of growth are 
expected in 2007 and 2008. Real GDP growth in India was 9 per cent 
in 2006. The pace of growth is expected to moderate in 2007 and 
2008 but the forecast growth rates of 8.5 per cent and 8 per cent in 
2007 and 2008 respectively will still see India among the fastest 
growing economies in the world. 
NIESR (2007)2 note that India
is, is now as large as Japan, accounting for 6.3 per cent of global 
output. On the same basis, China accounts for 15 per cent of global 
output, second only to the US which has a share of almost 20 per 
cent. NIESR (2007) also point out a notable difference between 
India and China. While China accounted for 7.5 per cent of world 
trade in 2005, India is much less integrated into world markets and 
accounted for just 1 per cent of world trade in 2005. For this reason, 
India has a lower impact on global prospects relative to China. 
2 National Institute for Economic and Social Research National Institute Economic 
Review, April 2007. 
 
 TABLE 1: Short-term International Outlook  
 GDP Output Growth Consumer Price Hourly Earnings Growth Unemployment Rate Current Account Balance 
 Inflation % % of GDP 
    
Country 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
                
UK 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.0 3.7 4.4 4.8 5.5 5.5 5.5 -3.4 -3.2 -2.7 
Germany 3.0 2.9 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.0 2.2 3.2 8.1 6.9 6.3 5.1 6.7 7.0 
France 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.3 1.7 3.2 3.0 3.0 9.0 8.4 8.0 -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 
Italy 1.9 2.0 1.7 2.2 2.0 2.1 3.1 2.7 3.8 6.9 6.3 6.0 -2.4 -2.5 -2.6 
                
Euro Area 2.8 2.7 2.3 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.9 3.5 7.8 7.1 6.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 
USA 3.3 2.1 2.5 2.9 2.6 2.2 4.7 3.9 3.8 4.6 4.6 4.8 -6.5 -6.1 -6.2 
Japan 2.2 2.4 2.1 -0.9 -0.4 0.2 -0.3 3.4 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.9 4.8 5.4 
China 10.7 10.4 10.4 1.6 1.8 1.5       9.5 10.2 10.6 
                
OECD 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.0    5.9 5.6 5.5    
Ireland 6.0 4.9 3.7 4.0 4.9 3.0 5.0 5.5 5.0 4.4 4.7 5.0 -3.3 -4.2 -4.5 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 81, May 2007; National Institute Economic Review, No. 200, April 2007. 
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 International Context for Ireland 
Growth in the global economy continues to be strong. The world 
economy grew by 5.3 per cent in 2006 and is expected to grow by 5 
per cent in 2007 and by 4.8 per cent in 2008. Unlike the earlier years 
of this decade, global growth is now more balanced by region. 
Although growth has eased in the US, both the Euro Area and Japan 
are now growing more strongly. World trade is also expected to 
continue to grow strongly, with growth rates of 7.5 per cent and 8.3 
per cent forecast for 2007 and 2008 respectively. 
While strong global growth is clearly good for Ireland, it brings 
with it some difficult features. First, interest rates are increasing in 
the Euro Area and elsewhere also, so the recent era of cheap money 
appears to be ending. Second, strong global growth is believed to be 
feeding into commodity price increases through demand effects. 
Third, large imbalances continue to exist across some regions. The 
US current account deficit remains large and questions persist over 
whether or not it is sustainable in the short to medium term. 
Although the likelihood of a significant adjustment over our forecast 
horizon appears to be low, the existence of large global imbalances 
remains a concern. 
 
 
General The Domestic 
Economy The CSO released preliminary quarterly accounts for the fourth 
quarter of 2006 in March 2007 with GDP growth estimated at 6.0 
per cent and GNP at a much higher 7.4 per cent.  These preliminary 
estimates include a number of important differences to our Spring 
Commentary estimates for 2006.3 Across all expenditure categories – 
consumption, investment, exports and imports – the preliminary 
CSO figures are lower than our Spring estimates. Nevertheless, the 
GDP growth rate is broadly similar. This is because of a very large 
increase in stock building (chiefly industrial stocks) in the final 
quarter of 2006, which on an annualised basis accounts for 1 
percentage point of the overall 6 per cent growth rate. Furthermore, 
the preliminary estimates imply a volume fall of 1.3 per cent in net 
factor income flows, which drives a significant positive gap between 
GNP and GDP. 
These changes have knock-on effects on our forecast numbers 
for 2007 and 2008. Our revised figures for 2007 include a negative 
contribution from changes in stocks, as the very high level of stocks 
built up towards the end of 2006 are run down. This reduces the 
GDP growth rate by 0.6 of a percentage point. The corollary to that 
is a higher exports growth figure, as these industrial stocks are 
exported in 2007. In addition we have revised upwards our forecast 
for government expenditure, given the current very fast pace of 
growth in both current and capital spending. Finally we have revised 
 
3 The Spring Commentary estimates for 2006 were largely based on Quarterly National 
Accounts figures out to Q3 2006.  
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 downwards our forecast for investment, because the most recent 
indicators all point to a sharper deceleration in the housing market 
than anticipated in the Spring QEC. 
We expect GDP to grow by 4.9 per cent in 2007, slowing to 3.7 
per cent in 2008. While this should allow employment to increase by 
up to 83,000 over the two years it could see the unemployment rate 
move up to 5.0 per cent by 2008.  The emerging deficit on the 
current account of the balance of payments is expected to widen 
further, partly driven by unfavourable movements in the terms of 
trade. The slowdown in economic activity relative to 2006, coupled 
with very strong growth in expenditure in 2007, means that the 
exchequer balance moves into deficit, equivalent to -0.6 per cent of 
GNP in 2008. This represents a sharp deterioration on the 1.5 per 
cent surplus recorded in 2006. 
Consumption 
According to the latest Quarterly National Accounts personal 
consumption grew by 9 per cent in value terms and 6.2 per cent in 
volume terms in 2006. As can be seen from Figure 3, the latest 
figures suggest a marginal slowing in the growth rate towards the 
latter half of 2006. Nevertheless, the figures still represent a 
continuation of the surge in consumption growth which began in 
2005.  
Figure 3: Annual Growth Rates in Personal Consumption and Retail Sales 
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 Most indicators suggest continued strong growth in consumption 
in the early months of 2007, although there are some indications of a 
slowdown on the horizon. In the year ended March 2007, Irish 
residents made more than 7 million overseas trips, an increase of 
over 13 per cent on the same period last year. Volume retail sales 
were growing at an annualised rate of 6.4 per cent in the year ended 
April 2007; excluding the motor trade, this figure was even higher at 
7.1 per cent. This implied slowdown in the motor trade is reflected in 
the purchase of new private cars, where the growth rate has been 
slowing in recent months. In the year to April 2007 the annualised 
growth rate was 3.2 per cent compared with 8.7 per cent in the year 
ended April 2006. In addition, according to the latest Central Bank 
statistics, the rate of increase in private sector credit has slowed from 
an average €4.9 billion per month in the first four months of 2006 to 
€3.9 billion in the first four months of 2007. These trends are 
reflected in the behaviour of the IIB/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index. 
While the balance of sentiment in recent months remains above the 
trough in sentiment recorded in 2003, there is a downward trend 
discernable in recent months relative to the recent peaks recorded in 
early 2005 and early 2006. 
Despite this mixed evidence on the future strength of 
consumption growth, we forecast volume growth of 7.8 per cent in 
consumption in 2007. This is driven by our expectation that over 
€2.4 billion of SSIA monies will be spent on consumption items in 
2007, equivalent to almost 3 per cent of the total growth in the value 
of consumption expenditure of 11 per cent.4 Apart from this once-
off effect, we expect that continuing strong employment gains and 
relatively high wage increases will see personal disposable incomes 
rising by 9.7 per cent in 2007, which will further underpin strong 
growth in consumption this year. Looking ahead to 2008, we expect 
consumption expenditure growth to slow sharply from 11 per cent to 
6.6 per cent, with volume growth of 4.5 per cent.  
Investment 
Investment grew by 3.9 per cent in volume terms in 2006, according 
to preliminary CSO estimates. This is almost half the growth rate 
estimated in the Spring Commentary, with the difference being almost 
entirely due to a very large fall in investment in machinery and 
equipment of 6.5 per cent in volume terms. There was a 3.1 per cent 
increase in volume of housing investment and a very large increase of 
16.2 per cent in the volume of investment in other building and 
construction. 
Total housing completions in 2006 reached a record level of 
93,419 units, according to the Department of the Environment, 
Heritage and Local Government (88,419 based on CSO adjusted 
figures). In more recent months most indicators suggest that this rate 
of activity has slowed significantly. In the first four months of 2007 
the total number of completions was 25,982, a fall of almost 8 per 
cent on the same figure in 2006. Furthermore, data on both planning 
 
4 For more detail see Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer 2006.  
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 permissions and commencements suggest a downturn in the future 
rate of house completions (see Figure 4). The abolition of stamp duty 
for first time buyers is expected to have a limited effect on overall 
demand in the coming months. Accordingly, we have revised 
downwards our figures for completions in 2007 to 82,000, falling 
further to 76,000 in 2008. We expect some continued increase in 
investment in home improvements in 2007, buoyed by SSIA funds, 
so that overall housing investment is expected to fall by 4.7 per cent 
in volume terms in 2007, and to fall more sharply in 2008, by 6.1 per 
cent. In relation to prices, the most recent data from the permanent 
tsb/ESRI house price index points to a fall of 1.3 per cent in house 
prices nationally in the first four months of 2007. We expect this 
trend to continue in the coming months and have included an 
estimated fall of 3 per cent in nominal house prices for 2007. For 
2008, we expect house prices to stabilise at their 2007 level. 
Combined with estimated continued growth in the deflator for home 
improvements, this implies a fall in the housing investment deflator 
of 1.7 per cent in 2007, followed by a slight increase of 1.1 per cent 
in 2008. 
Figure 4: Housing Statistics,5 Planning Permissions, Commencements and Completions 
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Source: Dept. of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and CSO. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The figure for 2005 is adjusted upwards to include an estimated 5,000 extra 
completions not included in DEHLG sources, Q1 2006 and Q2 2006 reduced by 
2000 and 3000 respectively as per DEHLG estimates.  
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TABLE 2: Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
 
  
 2005 % Change in 2006 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Housing 20,890 3.1 11.2 23,226 -4.7 -6.4 21,739 -6.1 -5.1 20,635 
           
Other Building 11,279 16.2 24.4 14,027 10.0 17.7 16,510 10.0 17.7 19,432 
           
Building and 
Construction 32,169 7.8 15.8 37,253 1.0 2.7 38,249 0.7 4.8 40,067 
           
Machinery and 
Equipment 11,413 -6.5 -6.2 10,706 12.0 14.4 12,247 8.0 10.3 13,510 
           
Total 43,582 3.9 10.0 47,959 3.7 5.3 50,496 2.6 6.1 53,577 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In the Spring Commentary we estimated that house prices were 
overvalued by 15 per cent based on the demand for primary 
dwellings. However, this calculation does not include the dramatic 
increase in the demand for second dwellings in recent years6 which 
we argued may help explain this “overvaluation”.   To the extent that 
this demand for second dwellings includes speculative investment, 
this introduces a degree of volatility to the housing market in the 
coming months. Our forecasts here imply a 14 per cent fall in 
housing completions between 2006 and 2008 together with a fall in 
real house prices7 of over 8 per cent. Given the current degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the housing market, this represents a 
relatively “soft landing” scenario.  
We have not changed our forecast of volume growth in 
investment in other building and construction. It is expected to 
continue to grow strongly this year and next, following very strong 
growth in 2006. This is partly driven by strong public sector 
investment under the National Development Plan (NDP), together 
with continued strong growth in commercial building and 
construction. We estimate that the NDP will add €1.4 billion to total 
investment in 2007 and €1.6 billion in 2008, equivalent to over half 
of the total increase in other building and construction investment. 
However, we have revised upwards our estimated deflator to 7 per 
cent8 based on the most recent Quarterly National Accounts estimates 
for 2006.   
The value of investment in machinery and equipment fell by an 
estimated 6.2 per cent in 2006. A large part of this was due to a fall 
of 44 per cent in the purchase of aircraft in 2006 following large 
purchases in 2005. However, even excluding the impact of aircraft 
purchases, investment in machinery and equipment grew by only 0.5 
per cent in value terms. The timing of planned aircraft purchases 
remains uncertain; based on current published figures we estimate 
that they could add as much as 5 per cent to the value of investment 
in machinery and equipment in 2007. Accordingly, we forecast strong 
growth of 14.4 per cent in the value of machinery and equipment 
investment in 2007, with volume growth of 12 per cent, thereby 
implying a recovery in the growth rate of non-aircraft investments. It 
should be noted that there is a great deal of uncertainty attaching to 
this forecast, which tends to be very volatile from year to year. For 
2008, we forecast volume growth of 8 per cent and value growth of 
10.3 per cent. 
These forecasts imply an overall growth in volume investment of 
3.7 per cent in 2007 and 2.6 per cent in 2008. These are very low 
growth rates relative to recent years and, if realised, will imply that 
the rapid rise in the share of investment in GNP of recent years will 
finally stabilise. 
 
 
 
6 Recent Census figures suggest that vacant dwellings and holiday homes accounted 
for almost 40 per cent of total house completions between 2002 and 2006. 
7 Deflated using the personal consumption deflator. 
8 Up from 6 per cent in 2007 and 5 per cent in 2008, Spring QEC. 
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Figure 5: Investment as a Share of GNP 
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Government Spending and Public Finances 
The May Exchequer returns indicate that tax revenues increased by 
9.5 per cent in the first five months of 2007 relative to the same 
period last year. This is compared to a growth rate of 16.7 per cent in 
the equivalent period in 2006. This slowdown in the pace of revenue 
growth between 2006 and 2007 has been mirrored in all of the 
monthly returns to date in 2007. The slowdown relative to 2006 was 
reflected across all revenue heads with the exception of income tax. 
However, the latter was boosted by the inclusion of the SSIA exit tax 
yield.  
We expect this slowdown to continue throughout 2007 and 2008, 
with forecast growth in exchequer tax revenues of 7.7 per cent and 
6.9 per cent respectively, equivalent to an actual increase of €3.6 
billion in 2007 and €3.4 billion in 2008. This contrasts with an 
increase of €6.3 billion in 2006, and if realised would imply a fairly 
dramatic reduction in tax buoyancy relative to 2006.  Put more 
technically, in 2006 the elasticity of exchequer tax revenues with 
respect to GDP was 1.8, while our forecast numbers imply an 
elasticity of 1.1 for 2007 and 2008, close to the long-run value of this 
elasticity. The key reason for this is the fall in the contribution of 
capital taxes to the growth in revenues. In 2006 capital taxes 
accounted for over €2.2 billion of the total increase in tax revenues; 
in our 2007 and 2008 forecasts the increases in capital taxes average 
below €800 million. This is driven by our forecast slowdown in 
residential construction in 2007 and 2008.  
In terms of voted expenditure the May Exchequer returns 
indicate a significant acceleration in the pace of growth of both 
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 cap
ndent 
for
ital and current expenditures. Total voted expenditure increased 
by €3,124 million (23 per cent) in the first five months of 2007 
relative to 2006, compared to just €980 million (7.7 per cent) in the 
first five months of 2006. The 2007 figure includes an increase of 
€841 million in voted capital expenditure, but also reflects a 
significant increase in current expenditure, 17.8 per cent in the first 
five months of 2007 compared with 8.1 per cent in 2006. Even 
though there has been a clear acceleration in the pace of expenditure 
growth in recent months, these expenditures are close to the official 
profile of monthly issues. As such this acceleration was anticipated 
and is, therefore, compatible with the official full-year target growth 
in expenditure of 13.8 per cent, albeit with a significant slowing in 
the pace of expenditure growth in the second half of the year.  
In Table 3 we use these official forecasts of current and capital 
expenditures, and capital receipts. Together with our indepe
ecast of tax revenues this gives an Exchequer Balance of -€622 
million in 2007, widening to -€1,057 million in 2008, a deterioration 
of €3.3 billion in just two years. In terms of the General Government 
Balance, these figures imply a fairly dramatic reduction of the balance 
from 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2006 to 1.1 per cent in 2007, reflecting 
the stimulatory nature of Budget 2007. 
TABLE 3: Public Finances 
 2006 % Change 2007 % Change 2008 
      
Current Revenue 46,145 7.7 49,695 6.9 53,133 
Current Expenditure 36,994 12.7 41,701 6.5 44,426 
Current Surplus 9,151 -12.6 7,994 8.9 8,707 
      
Capital Receipts 1,871  -20.7 1,483 -0.4 1,477 
Capital Expenditure 8,758 15.3 10,100 11.3 11,241 
Capital Borrowing -6,886 25.1 -8,617 13.3 -9,764 
      
Exchequer Balance 2,265   -622  -1,057 
 as % of GNP 1.5  -0.4  -0.6 
       
General Gove nmentr  Balance 5,031  2,132  2,489 
 as % of GDP 2.9  1.1  1.2 
      
Gross Debt as % of GDP 25.1  23.7  22.8 
      
Net Debt as % of GDP* 12.8   9.9  7.3 
*Net of Pensions Fund and Social Insuran
recent Quarterly National Accounts data indicate that exports 
9 per cent in volume terms and 7 per cent in value terms 
ce und.F  
Exports 
The most 
grew by 4.
for the year ending Q4 2006. According to the more detailed 
breakdown provided in the Balance of Payments, which only provides 
data in current prices, annualised export growth in 2006 was 
dominated by a robust expansion in services exports, with non-
tourism services exports growing by 18 per cent and tourism exports 
by 9.5 per cent. Merchandise exports growth was significantly lower 
at 1.3 per cent. 
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 TABLE 4: Exports of Goods and Services  
 
 
   2005 % Change in 2006 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 
        €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Merchandise 83,692 0.8 1.3 84,799 3.1 2.4 86,834 3.0 2.5 89,005 
Tourism 3,813 6.7 9.5 4,175 4.9  8.0 4,509 5.9 8.0 4,870 
Other Services 42,304 13.6 18.0 49,898 10.4 15.0 57,383 8.7 13.0 64,842 
           
Exports of Goods  
  and Services 129,809 4.9 7.0 138,872 6.0 7.1 148,726 5.2 6.7 158,717 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1,192   1,275   1,599   1,801 
           
Adjusted Exports 131,001 4.9 7.0 140,147 6.0 7.3 150,325 5.2 6.8 160,518 
 
 
 In previous Commentaries we have noted that there has been a mild 
recovery in merchandise exports since the years of negative growth 
rates in 2003 and 2004. This recovery was clearly seen in the growth 
rates in the first three quarters Balance of Payments data in 2006, which 
climbed steadily on an annualised basis. However, the data for the 
year ending Q4 2006 show that this pace of growth faltered towards 
the end of the year. Year-on-year growth in the value of merchandise 
exports in Q3 2006 was 4.5 per cent; in Q4 this was -4.5 per cent. It 
is uncertain whether this poor performance in the closing months of 
2006 reflects a clear downward trend, but for the moment we are 
treating it as temporary for the following reasons. First evidence 
from the most recent External Trade statistics shows that the value of 
merchandise exports grew by 5.7 per cent in Q1 2007 relative to the 
same quarter last year. Second, the performance of merchandise 
exports for 2006 as a whole was surprisingly poor given the strong 
growth in the volume of manufacturing output of 5.3 per cent.9 In 
light of the large build-up of industrial stocks in Q4 included in the 
latest Quarterly Accounts, this leads us to believe that merchandise 
exports will rebound this year as firms run down these large stocks 
built up towards the end of 2006. Third, we expect the industrial 
sector to grow by 4.5 per cent and 3.5 per cent in volume terms in 
2007 and 2008, and coupled with the increasingly favourable short-
term prospects for the economies of our major trading partners, this 
should sustain continued growth in merchandise exports, albeit at a 
modest pace. In 2007 and 2008 we expect growth in the volume of 
merchandise exports to be 3.1 and 3 per cent respectively. Given the 
recent declines in wholesale prices for manufacturing, we expect the 
merchandise export price deflator to fall by -0.7 per cent in 2007. 
Assuming no change in the dollar rate in 2008 we expect this 
downward trend in manufacturing export prices to continue in 2008. 
In 2006 services accounted for 39 per cent of the total value of 
exports and services export growth continued to outperform that of 
merchandise. The composition of this growth differed across the 
various service sectors, with business and financial services among 
the strongest at 27.3 and 27.5 per cent growth respectively.10 
Computer services maintained their position as the largest share of 
overall services exports at 30 per cent in 2006 although the growth in 
business services exports means it is now running a close second. 
Looking forward, we expect the pattern of more services-intensive 
export growth to continue, with growth in the value of services 
exports of 15 per cent and 13 per cent in 2007 and 2008 respectively. 
However, given our forecast acceleration in inflation in 2007, which 
feeds into the price of services exports, the respective volume growth 
rates are somewhat lower at 10.4 per cent and 8.7 per cent 
respectively. Tourism exports growth in value terms is forecast to 
hold steady at 8 per cent in 2007 and 2008 after seeing growth last 
year of 9.5 per cent due in part to the Ryder Cup, the highest rate 
since 2001. 
 
9 Annualised growth in Industrial Production Index (Manufacturing Industries). 
10 Growth in Royalties and Licences was the highest at 82.3 per cent but in absolute 
terms this sector still only accounted for 1.6 per cent of services exports in 2006. 
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 Our forecast for 2007 is for 6 per cent growth in the volume of 
exports of goods and services. This is an upward revision on our 
Spring forecast of 5.6 per cent, and partially reflects the improved 
forecast for growth in the Euro Area. We expect export growth to 
ease slightly to 5.2 per cent in 2008, as the current spate of interest 
rate increases globally begin to curb growth in the UK and the Euro 
Area. 
BOX: THE SHIFT FROM MERCHANDISE TO SERVICES EXPORTS 
In recent Commentaries attention has been drawn to the relatively poor 
performance of exports compared to that experienced during the late 
1990s and up to 2002. While merchandise exports have recovered 
following a contraction in 2003, the post-2002 growth rates are less 
than half those recorded in the pre-2002 period. Meanwhile growth 
in services exports has been robust over this period, outstripping that 
of merchandise exports. This trend is evidence of an underlying shift 
in the economy away from traditional manufacturing towards (in 
part) the services sector. While there are other factors that may affect 
exports, such as exchange rate movements, competitiveness 
pressures and the growth in the non-traded construction sector, the 
shift to services has the potential to be the most influential in the 
long run.11 
Table A shows exports as a proportion of GDP from 1998 to 
2006 in total and for merchandise and services separately. Exports in 
total have decreased as a percentage of GDP over the period, 
particularly since their peak of 100 per cent of GDP in 2001. This 
decline has been driven by the reduction in merchandise export 
share, which at the end of 2006 stood at just over 50 per cent of 
GDP. Services export share has expanded dramatically, almost 
doubling by the end of 2006 over 1998 levels. Expressed as a share 
of total exports, services exports have doubled over the period. 
 
Table A: Recent Trends, 1998-2006 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 
 % % % % % % % % % 
Exports % GDP            
Total 87 90 98 100 94 84 84 81 81 
Merchandise 70 71 76 74 69 56 55 52 51 
Services 16 18 21 24 24 27 29 29 29 
% Total Exports           
Merchandise 81 80 79 75 74 68 65 64 61 
Services 19 20 21 25 26 32 35 36 39 
Openness 
(Trade/GDP) 163 165 183 185 170 151 153 150 150 
 
Source: NIE 2005, QNA Q4 2006, BOP Q4 2006. 
*Provisional 
 
Given the nature of Ireland’s industrial mix, with its relatively 
high proportion of exports accounted for by multi-national 
enterprises, the economy has in many ways “punched above its 
weight” on the international exports stage. At the peak of the export 
 
11 For a more general discussion see Medium-Term Review 2005-2012 (MTR). 
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 performance in 2002 Irish exports accounted for 1.36 per cent of 
total world exports. In 2006 this share had fallen to just over 0.9 per 
cent.12 In the context of the value of world merchandise exports 
increasing by about 85 per cent over the same period it is clear that 
Ireland is facing stiffer competition in this sector. However this has 
been compensated for by the expansion in commercial services 
exports, as Ireland accounted for an estimated 2.45 per cent of world 
services exports in 2006 according to the World Trade Organisation. 
Despite this, for the world as a whole services’ share of exports has 
remained steady around 19 per cent in recent years and its growth 
has been below that of merchandise exports more often than not. 
These trends lead to Ireland’s share of total world exports declining 
in line with the overall decline in merchandise exports share. 
 
Figure A: Ireland’s Share of World Exports (1998-2006) 
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Source: World Trade Organisation statistics. 
 
Many commentators have noted the general shift to services in 
the Irish economy at the expense of traditional manufacturing. Most 
services by their nature are less likely to be exported than 
manufactured goods and as such this shift could lead to a more 
closed economy. The nature of the services sector expansion in 
Ireland has however tempered this prospect. It is evident from Table 
B that the value growth in the services sector has been in those 
services that can be readily exported, as services exports growth has 
outstripped growth in total marketed services output in most recent 
years. The marketed services sector is quite diverse, covering 
everything from hairdressers to finance houses, and Ireland’s services 
export growth is at the high value end of that spectrum. Growth in 
services sector exports has been driven by computer services 
(software), financial and business services. The availability of a highly 
skilled workforce and improvements in technology (particularly 
 
12 WTO Trade Statistics, expressed in current US dollars. 
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 communications technology) contribute to this growth. It must also 
be noted that services exports tend to have a greater degree of 
domestic value added when compared to industrial exports, as there 
is less “leakage” in terms of the value consumed by imported inputs 
to their production (MTR, 2005). However, the growth in services 
exports has not been sufficient to counter the falling share of 
merchandise exports. The trend of export growth outstripping 
output growth cannot be seen for merchandise to the same extent as 
services.  
As a result Ireland has become a more “closed” economy in 
recent years, with its degree of openness13 falling from a peak of 185 
per cent of GDP in 2001 to 150 per cent of GDP in 2006 (see Table 
A). While this is still evidence of a very open economy with respect 
to others, the extent of the current decline in openness is one that 
has not been seen in recent decades. The last time Ireland 
experienced any decline in openness before 2002 was in 1990. 
 
Table B:  Growth in Marketed Services and Industrial Output Compared to Growth in Services
and Merchandise Exports (Value), 1998-2006 
 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 
   %   %   %   %   %   %   %  % 
Marketed Services 
Output 12.2 18.2 13.5 11.0 12.8 8.5 11.1 8.3 
Services Exports 24.6 36.1 32.1 8.2 18.1 14.3 8.7 17.3 
 
Industrial Output (excl. 
construction) 16.6 13.2 9.7 11.2 -6.4 -2.2 1.1 6.5 
Merchandise Exports 16.5 25.5 8.4 3.2 -12.5 2.8 3.9 1.3 
 
Source: Own calculations based on National Accounts and Balance of Payments data. Marketed services output 2004-2006 
derived from growth in total services output. 
*Provisional. 
The emerging trends show Ireland entering a different phase of 
its development than experienced before. While domestic factors 
have contributed more heavily to overall growth in recent years, 
Ireland will always be a small fish in a big pond. In order to have 
consistent and stable growth in our standard of living the traded 
sector will still have to contribute. The shift to services, among other 
factors, has changed the way in which this contribution is made. The 
challenge going forward is to ensure that the growth in services 
exports is sufficient to counteract a fall in merchandise exports such 
that Ireland’s degree of openness remains high. 
Imports 
The most recent data from the Quarterly National Accounts estimate 
import value and volume growth at 8.8 and 5.3 per cent respectively 
for the year ended Q4 2006. The Balance of Payments data show that 
this growth was mostly attributable to a strong increase in services 
imports, with tourism services imports growing by 11.3 per cent and 
non-tourism imports at 10.9 per cent. The growth in merchandise 
imports was significantly lower at 6.5 per cent. 
 
13 Openness = (Exports +Imports)/GDP. 
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 TABLE 5: Imports of Goods and Services  
 
 
   2005 % Change in 2006 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 
        €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Merchandise 54,086 3.2 6.5 57,592 5.4 6.5 61,335 5.4 6.5 65,322 
Tourism 4,882  8.6 11.3 5,434 11.3 13.5 6,168 5.9  8.0 6,661 
Other Services 51,325 7.9 10.9 56,920 7.7 11.0 63,181 5.5 8.5 68,552 
           
Imports of Goods  
  and Services 110,293 5.3  8.8 119,946 6.9 9.0 130,684 5.5 7.5 140,535 
           
FISIM Adjustment 260   283    49     -7 
           
Adjusted Imports 110,553 5.3  8.8 120,229 6.9 8.7 130,733 5.5 7.5 140,527 
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 Export and import growth rates have moved in similar fashion in 
recent years. Despite this the annualised growth rates in the volume 
of imports as per the Quarterly National Accounts have been higher 
than that of exports since the Q2 of 2004. By the end of 2006 the 
difference in import and export growth rates had fallen to less than 
0.5 per cent (Figure 6). Data from the External Trade statistics suggest 
that the value of total merchandise imports grew by 3.9 per cent in 
the year to March 2007. There has been significant growth in 
merchandise imports from the new EU member states, with imports 
from Slovakia and Poland more than doubling for the first two 
months of 2007 when compared to the same period a year earlier. In 
terms of services imports, data from the Balance of Payments indicate 
that the growth rate in imports of services has outstripped the 
growth rate in imports of merchandise goods since the end of 2003. 
Within services imports, the strongest growth in 2006 was in 
financial services (40.3 per cent) while tourism imports also showed 
robust growth (11.3 per cent). 
Figure 6: Volume Growth Rates (from National Accounts, Annualised) 
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We forecast import volume growth of 6.9 per cent in 2007. This 
is driven by very strong growth in consumption, particularly in 
tourism imports where some of the SSIA funds will be spent. In 
2008 this slows to 5.5 per cent. This fall is mainly due to a slowdown 
in services imports growth, particularly tourism, as the pace of 
consumption growth slows. The equivalent value growth rates are 8.7 
per cent in 2007 and 7.5 per cent in 2008. 
Balance of Payments 
Our forecasts of merchandise exports and imports for 2007 and 2008 
lead to a further narrowing of the merchandise trade surplus in those 
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 years. The forecasts for merchandise export and import prices also 
point to a worsening in the terms of trade14 over the forecast 
horizon. Offsetting this is the continued narrowing of the service 
trade deficit. On balance however, we expect the trade surplus as a 
share of GNP to continue to decline to 11.2 per cent in 2007 and 
10.6 per cent in 2008.  
In relation to net factor flows the latest data from the Balance of 
Payments and the Quarterly National Accounts suggest that the net factor 
income deficit widened by just 1 per cent in the year ended Q4 2006. 
This relatively slow growth in net factor flows reflects both a 26 per 
cent fall in repatriated profits in 2006, and a further acceleration in 
the growth of factor flows into Ireland, which are estimated to have 
grown by a massive 35 per cent in 2006, mainly portfolio and other 
investment income. The more favourable export performance in 
2007 and 2008 would suggest that net factor flows will increase over 
the forecast horizon as multi-national enterprises repatriate export 
driven profits. However net factor flows are very difficult to 
determine, particularly when one considers the variation in growth 
experienced through 2006. 
The provisional CSO estimates for 2006 imply an effective 
current account deficit of 3.7 per cent of GNP. This is lower than 
our Spring estimate of 4.3 per cent and reflects the slower pace of 
growth in net factor flows and greater than expected growth in 
services exports. With the continuing decrease in the trade balance 
and a forecast growth of net factor flows of 6.7 per cent in 2007 and 
6.9 per cent in 2008, the current account deficit expands to 4.7 per 
cent of GNP in 2007 and 5.1 per cent in 2008. 
TABLE 6: Balance of Payments* 
 2005 Change 2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 
 €m % €m % €m % €m 
Merchandise Trade  
Balance 29,606 -8.1 27,207 -6.3 25,499 -7.1 23,683 
Service Trade Balance -10,090 -17.9 -8,281 -9.9 -7,457 -26.2 -5,500 
Trade Balance in 
Goods and Services 
on BOP basis 19,516 -3.0 18,926 -4.7 18,042 0.8 18,182 
% of GNP 14.4  12.6  11.2  10.6 
Total Debit Flows 67,764 22.9 83,285 15.8 96,405 16.0 111,807 
Total Credit Flows 43,447 35.1 58,714 20.0 70,457 20.0 84,548 
Net Factor Flows  -24,317 1.0 -24,571 5.6 -25,948 5.1 -27,259 
Net Current Transfers  601 -123.6 -142 -135.2 50 0.0 50 
Balance on Current 
Account -4,200  -5,787  -7,856  - 9,026 
        
Capital Transfers 266 -16.5 222 35.1 300 0.0 300 
Effective Current 
Balance  -3,934  -5,565  -7,556  -8,726 
% of GNP -2.9  -3.7  -4.7  -5.1 
*This table includes adjustments to Balance of Payments basis.  
 
 
 
 
14The terms of trade refer to the amount of imports a unit of exports can buy. If 
export prices rise more slowly than import prices then the terms of trade deteriorate 
since a larger volume of exports are needed to pay for a given volume of imports. 
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 Measures of Growth 
The most recent Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) estimate that 
GNP grew by 7.4 per cent in 2006, against a growth rate of 6.0 per 
cent in GDP. The difference is due to a volume fall in the growth of 
net factor income outflows. At present we are interpreting this gap 
with caution, and await the more comprehensive National Income and 
Expenditure (NIE) before attempting to assess this development. The 
reason for this is that revisions to these preliminary QNA estimates 
can be substantial. For instance, in the preliminary QNA estimates of 
GNP and GDP for 2005, published in March 2006, there was a 
similar positive gap between GNP and GDP. However, in the 
revisions contained in the NIE estimates published in July 2006 this 
gap had disappeared.  
Our forecast numbers imply a significant slowdown in the rate of 
growth in GNP and GDP through 2007 and into 2008. We expect 
GDP to grow by 4.9 per cent in 2007 and 3.7 per cent in 2008; the 
equivalent figures for GNP are 4.8 per cent and 3.7 per cent 
respectively. More importantly, we expect that the terms of trade will 
deteriorate in 2007 and 2008, so that GNP adjusted for the terms of 
trade grows by only 4.2 per cent in 2007 and 3.3 per cent in 2008. 
And finally, adjusting our estimates for changes in population, 
including the impact of immigration, our forecasts imply GNP per 
capita growth of 2.7 per cent in 2007 and 2.2 per cent in 2008, down 
from 4.7 per cent in 2006.  
Sectors 
According to the latest Quarterly National Accounts, output from 
industry grew by 6.1 per cent in 2006, well up on the 2005 figure of 
3.4 per cent. As this covers both construction and other industries, it 
is necessary to look to the Industrial Production and Turnover 
figures to get a clearer sense of what has been happening to non-
construction industries. 
In Figure 7, we show rates of growth in industry (excluding 
construction) based on the CSO’s volume indices of industrial 
production. Between 2000 and 2004, growth in manufacturing 
output declined steadily but since then a recovery has emerged. It can 
be seen in the figure that the modern sector has driven this recovery. 
While growth in the traditional sector was higher in 2006 relative to 
2005, the experience in this sector since 2001 has been for output to 
grow in the low single digits, at best. 
This positive picture from manufacturing is also seen in the latest 
NCB Purchasing Manager’s Index on Manufacturing (NCB PMI). 
The May reading was 51.9 and as such points to expansion (being 
over 50). Another positive note concerns employment growth. As 
discussed in the section on Employment below, according to the 
Quarterly National Household Survey for Q1 2007 employment in this 
sector grew for the first time on an annual basis since the first quarter 
of 2002. 
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Figure 7: Annual Rate of Growth in Volume of Industrial Production, 2000-2006 
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The question that is prompted by Figure 7 is whether 
manufacturing is in the midst of a sustained recovery. As the early 
outturns for 2007 are positive, with the volume index for the year 
ended Q1 2007 being 8.2 per cent higher than the twelve months 
prior to that, it certainly appears as if 2007 will be another year when 
the recovery will be sustained. We expect industrial output (excluding 
construction) to grow by 4.5 per cent in 2007 and by 3.5 per cent in 
2008. Hence, while we expect the recent performance to be 
maintained in the short term, we do not envisage a return to the 
growth rates seen in the early years of this decade. When the 
slowdown in construction (as discussed above under Investment) is 
factored in, industry (including construction) is forecast to grow by 
3.5 per cent in 2007 and by 3 per cent in 2008. 
Services output grew by 5.7 per cent in 2006, according to the 
Quarterly Accounts. Within this category, public administration and 
defence showed the slowest pace of output growth, at 1.9 per cent. 
Distribution, transport and communications grew by 5.4 per cent, 
with other services (including rent) growing by 6.2 per cent. The 
most recent indicator of activity in the sector, the NCB PMI, points 
to on-going growth – the index of business activity was at 54.9 in 
May.  
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TABLE 7: GDP by Sector  
 
  
 2005 Change  2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 
     €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Agriculture 4,103 -0.9 1.5 4,165 1.0 2.5 4,269 1.0 2.5 4,375 
           
Industry: 50,929 6.1 8.2 55,127 3.6 3.5 57,041 2.8 3.5 59,041 
Other Industry 36,689 5.5 6.5 39,073 4.5 3.8 40,558 3.5 3.0 41,775 
Building & Construction 14,241 7.8 12.7 16,054 1.0 2.7 16,483 0.7 4.8 17,267 
           
Services: 87,336 5.7 8.3 94,551 5.8 9.1 103,178 3.9 7.4 110,762 
 Public Administration & 
Defence 5,137 1.9 8.5 5,574 2.5 8.5 6,048 1.0 7.0 6,471 
 Distribution, Transport 
and Communications 22,086 5.4 7.4 23,717 5.0 6.9 25,352 2.0 3.8 26,311 
 Other Services 
(including rent) 60,113 6.2 8.6 65,260 6.3 10.0 71,779 4.8 8.6 77,980 
           
GDP at Factor Cost  - 
output basis 142,369 5.7 8.1 153,843 4.8 6.9 164,488 3.4 5.9 174,178 
 
 
 
 
 We expect services output to grow by 5.8 per cent in 2007 and by 
3.9 per cent in 2008. Within the broad services sector, we expect the 
same relative rate of growth to be maintained, with public 
administration and defence growing the slowest and “other services 
(including rent)” growing the fastest. With growth in this latter 
category outpacing growth in industry as well as in other services, it 
will remain the main driver of growth in the economy. This reflects 
the on-going trend towards a more service-intensive economy, in 
spite of the recent recovery in industry. This trend is even more 
pronounced when looked at in terms of value as opposed to volume. 
With higher services deflators expected, as a result of higher inflation 
in services relative to goods, the value of services output as a 
proportion of GDP is growing faster than that of industry. Our 
forecasts suggest that services will account for 63.6 per cent of 
output (in value terms) by 2008, an increase of almost 10 percentage 
points on the 1999 proportion. 
According to the Quarterly National Accounts, the volume of 
agricultural output declined by 0.9 per cent in 2006. Price increases for 
output offset the fall in output volume, whereby the value of output 
increased. For 2007 and 2008, we expect a modest recovery in output 
volumes (with 1 per cent growth in each year). 
Employment 
According the Quarterly National Household Survey for Q1 2007, 
employment grew by 4.2 per cent.15 This represents a strong pace of 
employment growth, both historically and relative to other 
economies. However, the pace of job creation appears to be slowing. 
As can be seen from Figure 8, the annual rate of employment 
creation appears to have peaked in the first quarter of 2006 and has 
been trending downwards since then.  
Construction continues to be the fastest growing sector in 
employment terms. There were 10.3 per cent more jobs in 
construction in the year ended Q1 2007 relative to the twelve months 
prior to that. Although this rate of increase is higher than those seen 
in the previous two quarters, the figure of 10.3 per cent does 
represent a slowdown relative to mid-late 2005 when employment 
growth in construction was recorded at 15 per cent and 14.4 per cent 
in Q3 and Q4 respectively. Furthermore, the April 2007 index of 
employment in construction (firms of 5 or more) suggests that 
employment in construction may have begun to decline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 The figure of 4.2 per cent is based on a comparison of the twelve months ended 
Q1 2007 with the twelve months prior to that. A comparison of the first quarter of 
2007 and the first quarter of 2006 produces an employment growth figure of 3.8 per 
cent.  
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Figure 8: Annual Employment Growth Since 1999 Q3 
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Health and Education remain the other main sectors of job 
growth, with annual rates of increase of 8.7 per cent and 7.4 per cent 
respectively. If we combine Construction, Health and Education, we 
find that almost 70 per cent of the jobs created in the period under 
discussion were created in these sectors. For this reason, the general 
pattern of recent quarters is being repeated whereby the vast bulk of 
jobs are being created in the non-tradable sector. The one minor 
exception is the increase in employment in “other productive 
industries”. Since Q1 of 2002, this sector had been recording 
negative employment growth so the employment increase of 0.5 per 
cent in Q1 2007 is noteworthy. This is consistent with the relatively 
stronger performance in industry in recent times and is counter to 
the view that may have emerged from media coverage of job losses. 
Whether the recovery will be maintained is discussed below. 
The economy’s experience of rapid employment growth 
continues to be closely linked with significant inward migration. 
According to the QNHS, 46,500 immigrants joined the labour force 
in the year ended Q1 2007 and hence accounted for almost 60 per 
cent of the growth in the labour force. Of this group, 45,200 entered 
employment, whereby immigrants also accounted for about 60 per 
cent of employment growth. Over 80 per cent of the newly 
employed immigrants are from the ten New Member States of the 
EU.16  
Looking ahead, we expect employment to grow by 58,000 in 2007 
(an increase of 2.9 per cent) and by 25,000 in 2008 (an increase of 1.2 
per cent). These forecasts imply a rapid deceleration in job growth. 
The main cause of the deceleration is the slowing of employment 
growth in construction. We see employment in construction growing 
by just 1 per cent in 2007 and by 0.5 per cent in 2008. This forecast 
follows from our forecast of a slowdown in housing construction but 
 
16 Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants are categorised under “others” in the QNHS 
release. 
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 is also based on the latest findings in the FAS/ESRI Vacancies 
Survey, which shows a steeper decline in vacancies in this sector 
relative to others. The survey also found that construction sector 
employers are the most pessimistic about future employment levels 
in their sector when compared with employers in other sectors. The 
construction sector employment expectations indicator is at its 
lowest level since November 2002. 
TABLE 8: Employment and Unemployment 
 Annual Averages 000s 
 2005 2006 2007   2008 
     
Agriculture 115 117 116 115 
Industry 539 560 559 553 
Services 1,298 1,362 1,422 1,453 
     
Total at Work 1,952 2,039 2,097 2,122 
Unemployed 89 93 103 111 
     
Labour Force 2,041 2,132 2,200 2,233 
Unemployment Rate % 4.4 4.4 4.7 5.0 
Net Migration 53.4 69.9 50.0 25.0 
   of which: Inward Migration 70.0 86.9 67.0 42.0 
Change in Participation Rate* 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.3 
* Note: Participation rate measured as share of population aged 15-64 years. 
 
A fall in employment growth will have implications for 
immigration, unemployment or participation, or probably some 
combination of all three. It is particularly difficult to forecast how 
migration will react, as we have no prior experience on which to base 
a forecast. Our approach is to allow for adjustment in all three 
variables. Hence, we forecast that unemployment will rise to 4.7 per 
cent in 2007 and to 5.0 per cent in 2008 (2006 figure is 4.4 per cent). 
The increase in participation is forecast to fall to 0.8 percentage 
points in 2007 and to 0.3 percentage points in 2008 (2006 figure is 
1.2 per cent). Finally, net immigration is forecast to fall from almost 
70,000 in 2006 to 50,000 in 2007 and to 25,000 in 2008. This decline 
is consistent with trends emerging from the PPS figures; data for 
April indicate that applications for permits are 10 per cent lower than 
in April 2006. 
Incomes 
In Table 9, we show annual growth rates in weekly earnings across 
the range of sectors for which we have data, for the years 1999 to 
2006. On average, weekly earnings grew by 4.8 per cent in 2006.17 
Earnings growth was slowest in Construction (at 1.8 per cent)18 and 
highest in Financial and Other Business Services (at 6.9 per cent).  
 
 
 
17 This figure is not directly comparable with the figure for wage growth in the 
Summary Table. The latter measures the growth in average annual earnings which 
include bonuses, holiday pay etc. not included in the weekly earnings figure. The 
weekly earnings figure is based on sector-level surveys. The annual earnings figure in 
the Summary Table is derived from the National Accounts. 
18 The first figures for 2007 show an annual growth rate in earnings in construction 
of 3 per cent, thereby pointing to a recovery in earnings growth in this sector. This is 
somewhat surprising give the decline in activity. 
   31 
 
TABLE 9: Growth in Average Weekly Earnings 1999-2006 
  Weekly Cumulative Annual Growth  
 Earnings Growth         
 Q3 2006 Q1 1999 - 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006** 
  Q3 2006         
  Euro % % 
Economy* 749.12 54.7 5.3 7.8 9.2 5.5 4.6 5.9 5.3 4.8 
Industry 623.69 57.4 5.6 6.6 8.0 6.5 6.8 4.7 3.6 3.6 
Construction 798.46 80.8 8.3 12.4 8.7 9.9 4.2 4.8 7.2 1.8 
Distribution 706.30 65.4 5.4 11.2 9.2 6.2 5.1 4.0 4.5 6.1 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 436.04 45.6 6.1 6.0 5.4 2.3 5.8 7.7 5.8 2.9 
Transport, Storage 
and 
Communications 787.37 49.9 3.6 6.0 8.8 0.7 5.1 5.0 4.1 5.8 
Non-Market Public 
Services 898.63 57.2 4.2 5.7 9.9 4.8 4.3 8.5 5.9 4.5 
Other Market 
Services 745.80 51.9 5.9 8.6 7.1 2.5 5.4 4.9 3.4 4.7 
Financial and Other 
Business 858.41 53.3 3.5 6.2 10.9 4.4 1.6 5.6 5.2 6.9 
*Weighted by employment, excludes agriculture and health sector earnings. 
**Annual growth for years 1999 to 2005 defined as the annual growth in the four quarter moving average
ended in Quarter 4. Annual growth in 2006 defined as the annual growth in the four quarter moving average 
ended in Quarter 3. 
 
These figures are of most interest in a comparative international 
context as it is only by comparing wage growth in Ireland to 
elsewhere that we get a sense of the competitiveness implications. In 
Table 10, we present figures for wage growth for the Euro Area, and 
also for France, Germany, Italy and the UK. It is clear from the table 
that Ireland has seen high wage growth relative to elsewhere. As an 
indicator of competitiveness changes, a comparison of wage growth 
across countries is overly simplistic as productivity improvements 
could counterbalance wage gains. However, we know that Ireland 
has experienced relatively low productivity growth in recent years so 
the data in Table 10 however, simplistic, point to declining 
competitiveness. In contrast, the German figures appear to go some 
way towards explaining the remarkable growth in German exports 
discussed in the International Section.   
TABLE 10: International Comparisons of Earnings Growth 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average  
2003-2006 
Euro Area 2.9 2.2 2.1 2.6 2.5 
France 3.2 1.7 3.2 3.2 2.8 
Germany 2.0 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.9 
Italy 3.8 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.4 
UK 4.8 4.2 4.1 3.7 4.2 
Ireland 4.6 5.9 5.3 4.8 5.2 
Source: CSO and NIESR (2007). 
 
 
 
For 2007 and 2008, we are forecasting continued strong rates of 
nominal wage growth. For 2007, our expectation is for wage growth 
of 5.5 per cent and for 2008, we expect a rate of 5 per cent. In the 
context of a softening in the labour market, these rates may seem 
high but they need to be understood in the context of CPI inflation. 
As we are forecasting CPI inflation of 4.9 per cent in 2007 and 3 per 
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 cent in 2008, the implied real wage growth is somewhat lower. We 
return to this issue in the General Assessment of the dangers of seeing a 
rapid and full feed through from CPI inflation into wages. We should 
also note at this point that our forecasts have not included any 
allowance for possible awards under the Public Sector Benchmarking 
Body. 
Combining our forecasts for employment and wage growth, we 
expect to see the non-agricultural wage bill growing by 8.7 per cent in 
2007 and by 6.4 per cent in 2008, a slowdown from the 2006 growth 
rate of 9.9 per cent. However, with transfers growing rapidly in 2007, 
as a result of the generous social welfare package in Budget 2007 
together with the scheduled repayment of nursing home charges, and 
other non-agricultural incomes growing more rapidly also, gross 
personal income will grow by 9.6 per cent in 2007, up on the 2006 
figure of 8 per cent. In 2008, we expect gross personal income to 
grow by 6.3 per cent. With consumption growing at a faster pace 
than personal disposable income in 2007 and 2008, the savings rate is 
expected to decline from 10.3 per cent in 2006 to 9.3 per cent in 
2007 and to 9.0 per cent in 2008. 
Consumer Prices 
The May 2007 estimates of consumer price inflation from the 
consumer price index (CPI) show a year-on-year increase in 
consumer prices of 5.0 per cent. The rate of increase in consumer 
prices has been rising steadily since the middle of 2005 and is now at 
levels last seen in early 2003, as shown in Figure 9. Figure 9 also 
shows the twelve-month moving average rate of inflation.  Following 
a spike of almost 6 per cent in 2001, inflation moderated to reach a 
low of 2 per cent in September 2004. However, since then the 
inflation rate has been increasing steadily and the average of the 
twelve months to February 2007 reached 4.6 per cent. 
To understand what is driving this escalation in price inflation it is 
useful to look at an alternative measure of inflation, the EU 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). This specifically 
excludes mortgage interest and a number of country-specific, non-
traded items,19 and is generally used to compare inflation rates across 
EU member states. In the last period of high inflation 2000-2003, the 
gap between the CPI and the HICP, which is largely driven by 
mortgage interest, was relatively small (Table 12). In contrast in 2006 
the HICP rate of inflation was 2.7 per cent while the CPI measure 
was 3.9 per cent. Our forecast for 2007 suggest that this gap will 
widen further due to the impact of interest rate increases on the CPI 
measure of inflation throughout 2007.  Since interest rate increases  
 
 
19 In addition to mortgage interest, the HICP also excludes building materials; 
concrete blocks; union subscriptions; motor car insurance; dwellings insurance; 
motor car tax and motor cycle tax. 
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TABLE 11: Personal Disposable Income  
 
  
 2005 Change  2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 
     €m % €m €m % €m €m % €m €m 
           
Agriculture, etc. 3,399 1.5 51 3,450 2.5 86 3,536 2.5 88 3,625 
Non-Agricultural 
Wages 65,272 9.9 6,434 71,706 8.7 6,259 77,965 6.4 4,989 82,954 
Other Non-Agricultural 
Income 16,956 4.4 745 17,700 6.9 1,222 18,922 6.3 1,190 20,112 
           
Total Income 
Received 85,627 8.4 7,230 92,857 8.1 7,567 100,423 6.2 6,268 106,691 
Current Transfers 17,633 5.6 989 18,622 16.9 3,147 21,769 6.6 1,444 23,213 
           
Gross Personal 
Income 103,260 8.0 8,219 111,478 9.6 10,714 122,192 6.3 7,712 129,904 
Direct Personal Taxes 19,580 9.1 1,781 21,362 9.3 1,994 23,356 6.3 1,467 24,823 
           
Personal Disposable 
Income  83,679 7.7 6,437 90,117 9.7 8,719 98,836 6.3 6,244 105,080 
Consumption 74,114  9.0 6,685 80,799 11.0 8,874 89,673 6.6 5,909 95,582 
Personal Savings 9,565 -2.6 -247 9,318 -1.7 -154 9,163 3.7 335 9,498 
Savings Ratio 11.4   10.3   9.3   9.0 
Average Personal 
Tax Rate 19.0   19.2   19.1   19.1 
 
 Figure 9: CPI Inflation Rate 
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TABLE 12: Inflation Measures (%) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 
HICP 5.3 4.0 4.7 4.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.3 
CPI 5.6 4.9 4.6 3.5 2.2 2.4 3.9 4.9 3.0 
Mortgage Interest 12.5 24.7 -7.6 -8.3 5.4 12.3 31.4 42.4 11.2 
 
 
are entirely driven by external forces, our forecast inflation rate of 4.9 
per cent greatly exaggerates the incipient domestic inflationary 
pressures running through the economy.20 
This is not to ignore the fact that HICP inflation, running at 2.7 
per cent, is far higher than the EU average. The latest data from 
Eurostat, for April 2007, shows that Irish inflation was running 
significantly higher than the EU average in a number of domestically 
generated categories, namely health; communications; recreation and 
culture; and restaurants and hotels.  
As stated above, the May CPI estimates imply an annualised rate 
of inflation growth of 4.6 per cent. Ignoring the sub-item mortgage 
 
20 There has been a good deal of discussion among economists in recent years about 
the manner in which the cost of housing is measured in the CPI. The current 
“payment approach”, which includes actual mortgage payments, means that both 
changes in interest rates and changes in house prices are reflected in the CPI 
measure of inflation. It is argued that this is not an accurate measure of the cost of 
living since it includes an element of asset appreciation/depreciation. (McCarthy, C. 
Owner-Occupied Housing Costs and Bias in the Irish Consumer Price Index, UCD. 
http://www.ucd.ie/economics/staff/cmccarthy/ownocc.pdf) 
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 interest, it is interesting to give an impression of the relatively high-
inflation sub-items within the index over the twelve months to May 
2007. These include beef (8.7 per cent); fresh fish (13 per cent); 
potatoes (7.1 per cent); dry cleaning and laundry (6.9 per cent); 
private rents (8.9 per cent); electricity gas and other fuels (8 per cent); 
out-patient services (7.1 per cent); taxi fares (8.2 per cent); postal 
services (7.6 per cent); sports admittance (6.2per cent); primary 
education (9 per cent); secondary education (8.3 per cent); 
accommodation services (9.3 per cent); hairdressing (6.9 per cent); 
health insurance (11.2 per cent). With the exception of food prices, 
which have shown some evidence of upward pressure in recent 
months, all of these items are services.  
Figure 10: Inflation Profile 2007-2008 (Forecast 2007M6 Onwards) 
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The outlook for 2007 is for a higher rate of inflation than 2006.  
We expect annual inflation to peak towards the end of 2007, partly 
driven by an assumption of a further 0.25 base points increase in 
ECB interest rates in September. The annual average rate of inflation 
for the year is forecast at 4.9 per cent.  In 2008, we forecast a rate of 
inflation of 3.0 per cent. The slowdown in inflation in 2008 is largely 
based on the technical assumption that there are no further interest 
rate increases in that year.  
 
 The Quarterly National Accounts for the fourth quarter of 2006 
suggest that GNP grew by 7.4 per cent last year, with GDP growing 
by 6 per cent. This growth has been accompanied by positive 
outcomes such as large increases in employment and favourable 
public revenue inflows. For these reasons the growth is, of course, to 
be welcomed. However, as we move through 2007 it is becoming 
clear that 2006 will represent a peak in terms of the recent experience 
of economic growth. With employment growth slowing, tax revenues 
growing more slowly than last year and early indicators of activity in 
house building pointing towards a slowdown, our task in producing 
General 
Assessment 
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 forecasts has been to estimate whether the slowdown will be 
moderate or otherwise. 
For now, our belief is that the slowdown will indeed be moderate. 
For 2007, we are forecasting GNP growth of 4.8 per cent and for 
2008 our forecast is for GNP growth of 3.7 per cent. Although 
slower than 2006, these rates of growth are high by international 
standards and so should be seen as a reversal to a sustainable rate of 
growth. While this moderate slowdown is our view as of now, a 
number of developments within the economy give rise to a concern 
that the slowdown could be steeper and so we elaborate on these 
issues also. 
Before looking at these points, we want to set the discussion 
below in the broader context of developments in the economy in 
recent years. In Table 13, we show annual growth rates in GNP, 
exports and productivity for the years 1996 to 2006. For the year 
2006, the rate of growth in GNP was similar to that of the late 1990s 
and so the perception may have held that the processes underlying 
the “Celtic Tiger” were still in operation. However, it is clear from 
the table that the economy was actually quite different in the years 
after 2001/02, relative to pre-2001. As can be seen, export growth 
collapsed in 2003 and has not approached the growth rates of the 
late 1990s since then. Similarly, productivity growth dropped in 2003 
and has languished since. On the basis of these figures, we would 
characterise the period 1996-2006 in terms of phases 1 and 2 of the 
Celtic Tiger, rather than a single period in Irish economic history. 
The growth in housing construction partly explains some of the 
other trends in Table 13. As a percentage of GNP, investment in 
housing rose steadily from 6.4 per cent to 15.5 per cent by 2006. As 
house building is a relatively low-productivity activity, it appears to 
have contributed to the pattern of productivity growth.  
TABLE 13:Growth Rates in GNP, Exports and Productivity 1996-2006, and Housing 
Construction as a Percentage of GNP, 1996-2006 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
GNP 7.8  10.1  7.7  8.5  9.7  3.9 2.8 5.5 3.9  5.3  7.4  
Export 12.5  17.6  23.1  15.5  20.2  8.6 4.5 0.5 7.3  3.9  4.9  
Productivity 4.3  6.8  2.3  3.3 3.8 4.4 4.4 1.4 2.0 0.8 1.2 
            
Housing  
Construction  
(% GNP) 6.4  7.2  7.7  8.7  9.2  9.8 10.2 11.8 13.6  15.4  15.5  
Note: Productivity growth is defined as rate of increase in GDP at factor cost per person employed. 
 
It is in the context of these developments that we look at the 
prospects for the economy. From Table 13, we know that we are 
looking at an economy where productivity growth has been low. This 
has impacted upon competitiveness which is reflected in the low rate 
of exports growth. As construction is a non-traded activity, it has 
been able to continue growing in spite of the falls in competitiveness. 
When viewed in this overall context, some recent developments in 
the economy point to the possibility of a steeper slowdown in 
economic activity relative to our forecasts. 
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 One such development is CPI inflation or more precisely the 
possible feed through from CPI inflation into wage demands. With 
CPI inflation running at around 5 per cent, the full feed through into 
wages could see wages rising by substantially over 5 per cent. This 
would imply that the trend highlighted in Table 10 above (in the 
section on Incomes) may continue, that is, high wage growth in Ireland 
relative to elsewhere. 
We noted in the last Commentary that this is a very real concern, 
based on recent experience. A regression equation relating growth in 
the CPI in one quarter to wage growth in the following quarter 
shows that the pass through has tended to be high and rapid. 
According to the equation, 50 per cent of the increase in CPI is 
reflected in wage increases within three months. At any time, such a 
rate of transmission raises concerns about excessive wage demands 
translating into job losses but a number of factors combine to make 
this a particular concern right now.  
One of these factors has been identified in Figure 8 above, where 
we showed how employment growth, while still strong, is declining. 
As with the general situation in the economy of growth returning to 
a sustainable level, the decline in employment growth should be seen 
in the same way. However, with employment growth already slowing, 
excessive wage pressures have a greater potential to lead to a more 
significant choking off of labour demand. In this way, the decline in 
employment gains could become steeper. It is more usual to see wage 
pressures easing as the rate of employment growth falls but at 
present we have a situation of falling employment growth and, 
potentially, continued strong wage growth. It is this combination that 
is troubling as it leads to the risk of accelerated job losses. 
High wage increases are not a concern if they are matched by 
strong productivity growth, but this has not been the case in Ireland 
in recent years. The rate of productivity growth in 2006 was an 
improvement on recent years but at 1.2 per cent was still well below 
the rates of increase prior to 2001. In addition, as productivity 
growth is typically pro-cyclical, we would expect productivity growth 
to be increasing and so the question arises of whether actual 
productivity growth is substantially below what would be expected 
given GNP growth. An analysis of the correlation between GNP 
growth and productivity shows that this is the case, thereby adding to 
concerns over the economy’s productivity performance. 
Having presented this concern over wage inflation and 
employment, the logical question arises as to what policy actions 
should be taken. In truth, the scope for a policy response that will 
have an immediate impact is limited. The problems of excessive wage 
growth relative to productivity growth can only be solved in the 
short-run within the labour market but we are cautiously optimistic 
on this point. As discussed in earlier Commentaries, the economic 
slowdown in 2001/02 led to wages rising by less than 1 per cent in 
real terms in 2002. As this was a rapid slowdown relative to the years 
immediately prior to that, we see this as evidence of flexibility within 
the labour market where wages respond to demand pressures. Such 
flexibility should insulate the economy from a more rapid slowdown. 
The government has very limited influence over wages in the 
economy. One area where policy can have an impact is with regard to 
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 public sector benchmarking; the other area where a government 
response may be needed is with regard to the National Pay 
Agreement. On benchmarking, as the government can be viewed as a 
purchaser of labour, it impacts upon wage inflation by adding to the 
demand for labour. As it increases the price it offers, other 
purchasers must do likewise. In this way, if there were substantial 
payments under the next round of benchmarking, they could add to 
wage pressures more generally. However, the larger concern 
regarding benchmarking is the extra tax burden that will be needed to 
finance any pay awards. 
With regard to the National Pay Agreement, we have argued 
previously that its impact on wages in the private sector is likely to be 
a lot less than is often asserted. For this reason, while we would urge 
the Government to be cautious with regard to calls for a 
renegotiation, we do so based on concerns regarding public sector 
pay and the potential tax implications, as just argued.  
Looking beyond the issue of wage increases, the short-term policy 
measures available to the government in response to some potential 
challenges are limited, where these challenges relate to productivity 
and structural shifts within the economy. Polices, for example, that 
aim to introduce greater competition in utilities or to up-skill the 
workforce, are more medium term in focus. To a great extent, the 
short-term limitations on policy arise out of where the Irish economy 
currently finds itself. The housing boom of recent years, in terms of 
price and construction activity, obscured some underlying 
weaknesses in the economy and may have contributed to those 
weaknesses. The main weakness was the loss in competitiveness. 
Although its impact was seen, for example, in lower export growth 
and little or no growth in manufacturing employment, the 
phenomenal growth in housing left headline numbers on growth 
unaltered. We now appear to be at the beginning of the end of the 
housing boom, partly in response to interest rate increases. 
The challenge for the economy is to move resources to new areas 
of economic activity, so that the transition path is as smooth as 
possible in terms of output and employment. Our forecasts for 
healthy services output growth and for modest growth in industry 
imply a confidence in the ability of the economy to manage the 
transition. However, the type of transition that we are describing 
involves an element of structural change. As such change is typically 
facilitated by policy in the medium and longer term, and not through 
short-term measures, there is limited scope for policy to assist. This 
means that any rapid slowdown will not be readily addressed by 
policy and as such leaves the economy vulnerable. 
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ON THE LIKELY 
EXTENT OF FALLS IN 
IRISH HOUSE PRICES  
Morgan Kelly∗  
 Looking at house price cycles across the OECD since 1970, we 
find a strong relationship between the size of the initial rise in price 
and its subsequent fall. Were this relationship to hold for Ireland, it 
would predict falls of real house prices of 40 to 60 per cent over a 
period of 8 to 9 years. The unusually large size of the Irish house 
building industry suggest that any significant house price fall that does 
occur could impose a difficult adjustment on the economy.  
Abstract 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to look at the likely behaviour of 
Irish house prices based on the experience of economies that have 
gone through similar booms. Looking at nearly 40 booms and busts in 
OECD economies since 1970, we find that the size of the initial 
boom is a strong predictor of the size and duration of the subsequent 
bust.  
1. 
Introduction 
Typically, real house prices give up 70 per cent of what they gained 
in a boom during the bust that follows. This is a remarkably robust 
relationship, holding across very different OECD housing markets 
over more than 30 years.  
Were this relationship to hold for Ireland, it would predict a fall 
in real house prices of around 40 to 60 per cent, over a period of 8 
or 9 years. Assuming an inflation rate of 2 per cent, this would 
translate into an annual fall of average selling prices of 6 to 7 per cent.  
Falls of this magnitude and duration are not unprecedented 
internationally. For example, the real price of Dutch houses fell by 
around half during the 1980s, as did those in Finland during the 
early 1990s. However, other large housing busts occurred in 
 ∗I would like to thank Christophe Andre for providing the OECD house price 
database used here, and to a referee for detailed and constructive criticisms of 
the submitted draft. All interpretations and errors are mine. 
email:morgan.kelly@ucd.ie 
economies with high rates of housing occupancy and relatively slowly 
growing stocks of houses. In Ireland, by contrast, housing stock has 
been growing at around 5 per cent per year, with about 15 per cent 
of the housing stock lying empty, increasing the potential for larger 
price falls than in previous OECD housing busts.  
Our estimate is in contrast with existing studies that measure over-
valuation by the size of a regression residual and find over-valuation 
of around 20 per cent. We demonstrate below, however, that unless 
based on very long run time series, such regressions are effectively 
meaningless.  
The principal macroeconomic reason for being concerned about 
a fall in Irish house prices is its impact on residential investment.  
Typically, an industrialised economy gets around 5 per cent of its 
income from building new houses, around the same that it gets from 
household spending on recreation. Ireland currently derives nearly 
three times this amount from building and selling houses.  Any 
sudden fall of residential investment to normal international, and 
national historical, levels, could have a substantial impact on national 
income, government finances, and unemployment: fewer than 15 per 
cent of construction workers are immigrants.  
Falls in residential investment, moreover, can be sudden as the 
example of Arizona shows. Until late 2005, Arizona was 
experiencing a house price and construction boom similar to 
Ireland’s. Then, as sales of new houses stalled around the start of 
2006, building fell suddenly:  from around 8,000 starts in May 2006 
(similar to Irish levels last year) to around 3,000 in November.  
The stagnation of the housing market even below the stamp 
duty threshold makes it evident that the reduction or elimination of 
stamp duty will not alter the basic dynamics of the housing market. 
Markets like housing are driven by fear of offering less than other 
bidders and ending up with nothing. With a large inventory of 
unsold houses, the permanent-tsb house price index showing monthly 
falls, and the irishpropertywatch.com tracking site showing that cuts 
in asking prices of €50,000 are now commonplace, potential buyers 
have an incentive to wait and see if prices will fall further. At the 
same time, rents are likely to fall as discouraged vendors attempt to 
let out empty properties.  
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 rehearses the 
relevant economic theory of rational frenzies in asset markets. 
Section 3 looks at the nearly 40 cases since 1970 where OECD 
economies have experienced house price rises followed by falls, and 
shows that the magnitude of the boom is a strong predictor of the 
size and duration of the subsequent bust. Section 4 shows how the 
stagnation of rents since 2000 while house prices doubled means 
that the Irish housing market has not been driven by strong 
fundamental demand. Section 5 looks at the possible magnitude and 
duration of house price falls, and their potential macroeconomic 
effects.  
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The familiar efficient markets hypothesis predicts that changes in 
asset prices are unpredictable. The price reflects individuals' 
information about asset’s present value and changes as this 
information changes. Agents with good information buy, driving up 
the price, and those with bad information sell, driving it down.  
2. 
Economic 
Theory 
However, instantaneous revelation of information through trade is 
not possible in house markets due to the very large transaction costs 
involved. In addition, the market lacks means for individuals to 
convey negative information through short sales.  
As a result, housing markets are better modelled as information 
cascades: the actions of other agents signal their private information 
and can cause individuals to ignore their own signals and follow the 
herd (Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). Two models in the 
cascade literature are particularly useful for understanding the 
dynamics of housing markets: the rational frenzies model of Bulow 
and Klemperer (1994) and the wisdom after the fact model of 
Caplin and Leahy (1994). 
Bulow and Klemperer (1994) model rational frenzies in auctions 
where participants reveal their valuations by bidding. Suppose that 
there are k items available. If individual reservation prices were 
known with certainty, everyone would wait until the price fell to just 
above the reservation price of the k + 1-th highest person, and then 
all buy together.  In practice, only the probability distribution of 
reservation values is known, and by bidding, or failing to bid, 
individuals reveal information about their valuations, allowing all 
participants to update their estimates about the value of the k + 1-th 
highest reservation price.  
As a result, bidders with very different valuations have very similar 
willingness to pay. Price drops until one person bids. The 
information this reveals about the true distribution of willingness to 
pay can set off a bidding frenzy among the other bidders, driving up 
price again until it becomes clear that price is again above 
willingness to pay.  Bidding then stops, causing prices to collapse 
until another bidding frenzy starts.  
As well as being volatile, Bulow-Klemperer predict that the 
relationship of house prices to fundamentals such as income and 
interest rates need not be straightforward. To the extent that 
individuals depart from Bayesian rationality, altering reservation 
values in response to observed trends in prices, these effects will be 
amplified.  
Caplin and Leahy (1994) look at investment where individuals 
have Gaussian signals. If the true state is bad, individuals continue 
to invest, driven by the dominating effect of past actions. Eventually, 
however, because signals are not bounded, a few agents get 
sufficiently bad signals to induce them to stop investing, causing 
priors rapidly to move to a belief that the state is bad, leading to a 
market crash and “wisdom after the fact”.  
 
Economic theory predicts that house prices should not follow a 
random walk, but should be a mean-reverting process of booms and 
crashes around a slowly increasing trend reflecting the growth of 
household income. This is what the international data show.  
3. 
Mean 
Reversion in 
House Prices Large falls in real house prices in the aftermath of housing booms 
are common internationally.  Table 1 shows the 18 cases since 1970 
where OECD economies have experienced falls in real house prices 
of at least 20 per cent, along with the previous price rise, and the 
duration of the fall. It can be seen that, in contrast to stock or 
currency markets, falls are prolonged, usually lasting 5 to 7 years, with 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Japan all experiencing more than a 
decade of falls. This reflects the reluctance of sellers to cut nominal 
prices, meaning that inflation does most of the work in reducing real 
prices.1 
Table 1: Magnitude and Duration of Falls in Real House Prices 
 Peak Year % Fall Previous 
Rise 
Duration of 
Fall  
Netherlands 1978 50 98 7 
Finland 1989 -48 109 6 
Switzerland 1989 -39 70 10 
Norway 1987 -39 53 6 
Denmark 1978 -36 22 4 
New Zealand 1975 -35 57 5 
Sweden 1979 -35 26 6 
Spain 1977 -33 24 4 
Denmark 1986 -32 52 6 
Japan 1974 -31 56 4 
Italy 1982 -30 84 4 
Finland 1974 -30 22 5 
Japan 1991 -27 78 10 
Sweden 1990 -27 38 6 
Italy 1992 -26 65 6 
Switzerland 1973 -26 34 4 
Ireland 1981 -22 53 5 
Canada 1981 -20 6 4 
 
Shiller (2006) looks at three long series of real house prices: 
Amsterdam from 1628 to 1973, Norway from 1819 to 1989, and the 
United States from 1890 to 2005. In all cases he finds that although 
there are substantial and long lasting peaks and troughs, there is 
scarcely any upward long-run trend in prices.  
Figure 1 shows the same pattern for smaller OECD economies:  
the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, since 
1970. The diagram shows the ratio of average house prices to 
disposable income but real house prices show a very similar pattern. 
Again, as economic theory predicts, there is considerable volatility and 
no sign of long-run trends. In contrast to stock price data, the 
tendency of prices to return to their long-run average means that 
 
1The referee observes the one small economy that is notably absent from the list of 
booms and busts is Belgium. It would be useful to identify the sources of this 
stability, and whether they could be adapted to reduce future volatility in the Irish 
market. 
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the size of price falls can be predicted from the size of the price rise 
that preceded them.  
Figure 1: House Prices Relative to Disposable Income in Smaller OECD 
Economies Since 1970.  Index: 2000 equals 100 
Figure 2 plots the size of increase in house prices for 17 OECD 
economies, against its subsequent fall.2 For clarity, we exclude other 
variables such as interest rates that other studies find to have limited 
explanatory power for house prices: we are focusing on weak form 
efficiency of housing markets.  
To estimate the peaks and troughs in each series for each 
country, we first calculated percentage changes for each quarter.  A 
Friedman supersmoother (implemented in the R statistics package) 
was then applied to the percentage changes to eliminate short-run 
fluctuations. Peaks and troughs were then identified as the end of 
runs of positive or negative changes in the smoothed series, and actual 
price changes calculated between these points.  
Percentage rises and subsequent falls are calculated relative to 
different values: troughs and peaks respectively. Remember that a 
rise of p per cent only needs a fall of p/(1 + p) per cent to reverse it. 
To eliminate this complication, all rises in Figure 2 and subsequent 
regressions are expressed as a percentage of peak values: for example 
a rise from 50 to 100 is treated as a 50 per cent rise, rather than a 100 
per cent one.   
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2These economies are Denmark; Finland; Ireland; Netherlands; Norway; New 
Zealand; Sweden; Switzerland; United States; Japan; Germany; France; Italy; Britain; 
Canada; Australia and Spain. 
Figure 2 shows that there is a strong linkage between rises in real 
house prices and subsequent falls. There is one evident outlier 
corresponding to a dip in house prices in Spain that occurred in the 
early 1990s in an otherwise continuously up-ward trend that saw real 
prices quadruple between the mid-1980s and the present.  
Figure 2: Percentage Rises in Real House Prices (Expressed as a 
Percentage of Peak Values), and Subsequent Falls for 
OECD Economies Since 1970  
 
Table 2 shows a regression of the percentage fall in house prices 
against their previous rise, both including and excluding the Spanish 
early-1990s outlier, for real house prices and the house price to 
income ratio. The slope of -0.7 for real house price means that 70 
per cent of the rise during a boom (expressed relative to the peak 
value) is lost during the subsequent bust.  
It is worth emphasising that these regressions are simply a 
summary of data. Beyond being a standard test of weak form 
efficiency of the housing market, they do not purport to test any 
model. In particular, the approach here can convey no information 
about the timing and magnitude of peaks preceding troughs.  
By comparison Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) find weaker mean-
reversion in house prices in US metropolitan areas: a one dollar rise 
over five years is typically followed by a fall of 30 cents over the 
following five years.  
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Table 2: Predictability of House Price Falls from Preceding House Price Rises  
 Intercept Initial Rise SER R2 BP N 
 
 Real House Prices 
  
All -0.0489 
(0.0363) 
-0.5746** 
(0.131) 
 
0.1085 0.3548 0.022 37 
Excl. Spain -0.0252 
(0.0356) 
-0.7025** 
(0.1347) 
0.1021 0.4445 0.483 36 
  
 House Prices Relative to Disposable Income 
  
All -0.1168** 
(0.0389) 
-0.6115** 
(0.1899) 
 
0.1275 0.219 0.187 39 
Excl. Spain -0.104** 
(0.0395) 
-0.713** 
(0.2013) 
0.1259 0.2584 0.428 38 
OLS regression of percentage falls in real house prices and house prices relative to income on 
preceding rises for 17 OECD economies from 1970 to the present. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 *denotes significance at 5 per cent, ** at 1 per cent. BP is p-value of studentised Breusch-Pagan test 
for heteroskedasticity.  
 
 
What is notable about the diagram and regressions is how strong 
the relationship between price rises and falls is. Across very different 
housing markets in very different economies over a period of more 
than 30 years, there is a common relationship between the 
magnitude of booms and subsequent busts. Rent-price series show 
similar mean reversion but because of the small size of the rented 
sector in many economies, and the presence of rent controls in part 
of the period, the data are not as reliable as the real price and price-
income series.  
As always, national averages conceal substantial variations across 
regions and types of property. During the last British housing crash, 
for example, while selling prices nationally fell on average by 10 per 
cent, they fell in East Anglia by 40 per cent; while models such as 
Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) predict that the upper end of the 
market should be the most volatile.  
As Table 1 suggests, there is a relationship between the 
magnitude of real price falls and their duration.  Table 3 gives the 
results of a regression of the average annual rate of house price falls 
on their magnitude, and shows the two to be closely related.  If p is 
the proportionate price fall, so prices fall from 1 to 1 - p over t 
years, it follows that r = ln(1 - p)/t is the average rate of decline. 
Table 3 gives the results of a regression of r on p.  For every 10 per 
cent extra decline in real prices, the annual rate of decline rises by 
1.5 percentage points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Rate Versus Magnitude of Falls in Real House Prices for 
17 OECD Economies Since 1970  
 
Table 3: Connection Between Annual Rate of Decline and 
Magnitude of House Price Falls  
Intercept Price Fall SER R2 BP N 
 
-1.6784** 
(0.4709) 
0.1494** 
(0.0206) 
 
1.6434 0.6014 0.121 37 
OLS regression of average rate of fall of real house prices on percentage fall for 17 
OECD economies from 1970 to the present. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 *denotes significance at 5 per cent, ** at 1 per cent. BP is p-value of studentised 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity.  
 
 The evidence of nearly 40 cycles in house prices for 17 OECD 
economies since 1970 shows that real house prices typically give up 
about 70 per cent of their rise in the subsequent fall, and that these 
falls occur slowly.  
4. 
 The Irish 
Housing 
Bubble, 
Causes and 
Consequences 
Before looking at what these numbers may imply for Ireland, it 
is necessary to dispose of the idea that Irish house prices merely 
reflect strong fundamentals: rising income and increased household 
formation due to the age structure of the population, declining 
household size, rising employment, and immigration.  
This argument is hard to sustain. If the rise in house prices 
were due to increased income and more people needing somewhere 
to live, we would have observed rents rising alongside house prices. 
Figure 4 shows how house prices have risen far faster than either 
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 rents or income. In fact, while rents doubled relative to income 
between 1995 and 2000, the ratio has remained unchanged since. 
The failure of rents to rise, along with the number of recently built 
units that have been bought but are lying empty (FitzGerald, 2005), 
suggests that the Irish housing market has left the dull world of 
fundamental values far behind it.  
Figure 4: Irish House Prices Since 1970 in Real Terms, Relative to Income, and 
Relative to Rent. Index: 1995 Equals 100  
 
A back of envelope calculation of the fundamental price of 
housing is the following. Abstracting from maintenance costs 
(which typically run around one month’s rent) suppose that housing 
generates an annual rent of n. This is a fraction ν of disposable 
income y  which is expected  to grow  through  time at rate g.  The 
present value of this infinite income stream is then  
p =  νy 
        r - g 
where r is the discount rate. As Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 show, 
housing is not a risk-free asset, and this discount rate needs to 
exceed the risk-free rate by an amount reflecting the fundamental risk 
of the asset. For housing, fundamental risk is large: housing is the 
largest item by far in most people’s asset portfolio and price changes 
are strongly correlated with income growth. To be conservative, 
however, we can assign a value of r of 8 per cent, equal to the long run 
real return on equities.  
The ratio of fundamental price to rent is 1/(r - g). To explain 
why Irish house prices have doubled relative to rent since 2000 we 
need to ask if there is any reason to suppose that new information 
has arrived causing long run estimates of (r -g) to be rationally halved. 
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Ireland’s stagnant exports, diminishing competitiveness, and the 
increasing structural problems of sectors such as IT and 
pharmaceuticals, would suggest that estimates of long-run income 
growth for the Irish economy g should have fallen in this period.  
While it may be the case that increased international demand for 
quality assets may be driving down equilibrium returns (Caballero, 
2006), there is no reason to believe that long-run expected returns on 
risky assets r have halved in the past 7 years.  
As White (2006) has observed, there is considerable variation in 
price-rent ratios within Dublin, with values in the range 80-100 at 
the top of the market. These values recall the peaks of the dotcom 
bubble and can be rationalised, with a discount rate r ≈ 0.08, only 
with real long-run growth of income of 6 to 7 per cent, equivalent to 
a doubling of real income every 10-12 years. This is the rate achieved 
by Korea during its transition from effectively the stone age to an 
industrial economy but has not been remotely approached by any 
rich economy. Alternatively, assuming an equilibrium price-rent ratio 
in the region of 15, it suggests that large falls in prices, of the order of 
85 per cent, might be needed for the top of the market to return to 
fundamental value.  
Again it is worth reminding ourselves that, just as in stock 
markets, fundamental measures such as price-earnings ratios have 
limited explanatory power for price changes in the short run.  
While other parts of the market appear less over-valued, they are 
still expensive by international standards. The Global Property 
Guide website reports that the average Dublin apartment rents for 
around 4 per cent of its purchase price. Only Madrid among major 
cities has a lower ratio. By comparison, London apartments return 
nearly 6 per cent, and Amsterdam and Paris over 8 per cent.  
 
 Were Ireland to experience the same housing dynamics as every 
other OECD economy, except Spain in the early 1990s, what sort 
of price changes might be expected?  Recall that Table 2 predicts 
a 7 per cent fall for every 10 per cent rise (relative to peak values) 
of real prices from their trough level, with a standard error of 10 per 
cent.  
5. 
International 
Perspectives 
on the Irish 
Housing 
Bubble 
Since the mid-1990s, real house prices have risen from an index 
level of 100 to around 350, and increase in terms of peak value of 70 
per cent. If 70 per cent of this rise were to be subsequently lost – as 
occurred during our previous bust in the early 1980s – the predicted 
fall in real house prices would be 50 per cent with a standard error 
of 10 per cent. In other words, a 68 per cent confidence interval for 
price falls would be in the range of 40 to 60 per cent. There would 
be one chance in eight of a price fall of only 30 to 40 per cent, just 
as there is a predicted one chance in eight of a fall of 60 to 70 per 
cent.  
Similarly, Table 2 predicts, given an approximately 70 per cent 
rise in the price income ratio, that the price income ratio will fall 
by around 60 per cent, with a standard error of around 12.5 per 
cent.  
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 It must be emphasised that these estimates are extrapolations: no 
economy in our sample of busts following booms experienced a rise 
as large as Ireland's. A fall in real prices of 50 per cent from Table 3, 
implies a predicted annual rate of decline of around 9 per cent, with a 
standard error of approximately 1.5 per cent. This translates into a 
decline of around 8 years, of the same order of magnitude as that 
experienced in the Netherlands in the 1980s or Britain in the 1950s. 
Assuming an inflation rate of 2 per cent, this implies an annual fall 
in selling prices of 7 per cent.  
These estimates may be unduly optimistic. In all the housing 
cycles on which the regression was based, housing stock was, for 
practical purposes, fixed. In Ireland, by contrast, the number of 
housing units is growing at around 5 per cent per year, which would 
suggest the potential for larger falls than those experienced in other 
OECD housing slowdowns.  
5.1 FUNDAMENTAL REGRESSIONS  
The prediction that Ireland may experience house price falls in the 
range of 50 per cent, is a good way from the OECD estimate (Rae 
and van den Noord, 2006) that Irish houses are overvalued by only 
around 20 per cent. However, the OECD methodology, and that of 
similar studies, is problematic. Such studies run a regression of house 
prices on interest rates, disposable income, employment and other 
fundamental variables. The regression residuals are then equated 
with the degree of over- or under-valuation in the market.  
To see this, consider a regression of Irish real house prices on 
disposable in-come since 1976 gives a residual for the last quarter 
of 2006 of 17 per cent. If instead house prices had changed by twice 
as much each quarter as they did, the regression residual would find 
that they were 35 per cent over-valued, while prices would be four 
times as high as they are now. Measuring over-valuation using 
regression residuals is a valid approach if very long-run series are 
available to tie down coefficient values, but using short-run series, as 
existing studies do, leads to meaningless results.  
5.2  MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES  
House price falls have three effects. First, households feel less 
wealthy and consume less.  Evidence from the United States points 
to a final long-run marginal propensity to consume from housing 
wealth of around 10 per cent: a $100,000 rise in property values, 
increases household consumption eventually by a total of $10,000 
(Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek, 2006). Second, banks face more bad 
loans, and become more cautious in their lending, leading to further 
falls in creditworthiness through the standard financial accelerator. 
Finally, the value of Tobin's q for residential investment falls, 
reducing house building. Most countries devote about 5 per cent of 
national income to building houses and in a typical housing bust, 
this falls to around 4 per cent of national income.  
In most cases then, housing busts are uncomfortable, but not 
macroeconomically disastrous events.  How about Ireland?  There 
is some evidence that the wealth effect on consumption might not 
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be as strong as in the United States: there has been no fall in 
personal saving in Ireland during the housing bubble, and 
households have not consumed home equity through second 
mortgages (Hogan and O'Sullivan, 2006). Similarly, the larger banks 
which dominate lending are well capitalised and the banking system 
has, until recently at least, avoided the worst excesses of the sub-
prime mortgage market, although it is likely that many interest-only 
and 100 per cent mortgages could go sour, especially given the ease 
with which delinquent borrowers can relocate to England.  
It is the scale of the Irish house building industry that makes a 
fall in house prices potentially troubling. While most economies 
derive only 5 per cent of their income directly from residential 
construction, in Ireland house building accounts for around 15 per 
cent of national income.  
Effectively, the recent growth of the Irish economy looks similar to 
the unstable case of an old-fashioned multiplier-accelerator model. 
The employment growth in the Celtic Tiger period of the 1990s led 
to increased demand for housing, reflected in rising real house 
prices and rent to income ratios. This stimulated house building, 
which generated more employment, leading to more demand for 
housing, and so on. Effectively, the Irish economy has come to be 
driven by building houses for all the people whose jobs have come, 
directly or indirectly, from building houses.  
It is hard to envisage how a fall in house building from 15 per 
cent to 5 per cent of national income might be achieved without 
considerable macroeconomic dislocation. Building booms, 
moreover, tend to end suddenly:  the example of Arizona in the 
summer of 2006 shows how a housing market can move in the 
space of a few months from buyers queuing overnight to buy, to 
empty tracts of new houses being priced below construction cost and 
still failing to sell.  
 
 This paper has taken an international perspective on the Irish 
housing boom. We have shown that there is a close relationship 
historically across very different economies and housing markets 
between the size of increases in real house prices, and subsequent 
declines. If this relationship were to hold for Ireland, the expected 
fall in average real house prices is in the range 40 to 60 per cent, over 
a period of around 8 years. Such a fall would return the ratio of house 
prices to rents to its level at the start of the decade.  Given the 
unusual reliance of the Irish economy on building houses, the 
effects of any such fall on national income may be somewhat larger 
than that experienced at the end of other housing bubbles.  
6.  
Conclusions 
Policy implications are straightforward. Booms and busts are a 
normal part of property markets. The government did not cause the 
current boom, and is powerless to do anything about a subsequent 
bust. In particular, cuts in stamp duty will not change buyers’ self-
fulfilling incentive to wait and see if prices fall further.  
Blanchard (2006) has observed that Euro-area economies appear 
at risk of rotating recessions:  increased domestic demand drives up 
real wages and erodes competitiveness, but the impossibility of 
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 devaluing means that prolonged rises in unemployment become the 
only means to reduce real wages. Notable current examples are Italy 
and Portugal. There may be some risk that the sharp fall in Irish 
competitiveness since 2000, which has been disguised and, to some 
extent, caused by the construction boom, may require a lengthy 
period of high unemployment to reverse.  
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VALUING IRELAND’S 
PENSION SYSTEM 
Shane Whelan∗ 
 
 Despite considerable research, no consensus has yet emerged on 
the design of a sustainable pension system for Ireland. This paper 
takes a novel market-consistent approach and, in so doing, 
challenges the assumptions underlying the costing of alternative 
systems presented in Pensions Board reports (2005, 2006). It is 
shown that by ignoring investment risk and its consequences, the 
cost and value of pensions are materially understated. It is argued 
that risky investment strategies are not appropriate for modest or 
mandated pension savings and they propose, at the very least, that 
the state develops and maintains a market in index-linked stock to 
help pension savers manage investment risk. It is shown that a 
system based on mandatory personal pension savings in low risk 
government guaranteed investments is functionally very similar to a 
sustainable pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. The two systems are 
contrasted from the perspective of value-for-money for 
contributors. We conclude that the sustainable PAYG is superior, 
delivering pensions of the order of one-fifth higher for the same 
level of contribution due to lower administration costs. Accordingly, 
we propose a better solution than simply the state maintaining a 
market in index-linked securities: Ireland’s current PAYG system 
should be developed into a sustainable version that provides all 
mandated pensions.  
Abstract 
 
 The last couple of years have been a time of unprecedented 
research within both the pension industry and academia on the 
functioning of the pension system in Ireland. The activity was 
sparked in February 2005 by the Minister for Social and Family 
1. 
Introduction 
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Affairs when, after consultation with the Government, he requested 
the Pensions Board bring forward a full review of the Irish pension 
system. Two substantial reports were prepared under the aegis of 
the Pensions Board, National Pensions Review (2005) and, at the 
further request of the Minister, a supplemental report on a 
mandatory pension system, Special Savings for Retirement (2006). These 
reports, when coupled with survey studies of the operation of the 
existing system (for example, Hughes and Watson (2005); Steward 
(2005); Whelan (2006); Department of Social and Family Affairs 
(2005)), set out a comprehensive overview of the current system 
and possible alternatives.  
One of the issues central to the debate is the sustainability of our 
current system against the forces of reducing fertility, increasing 
longevity and the demise of the occupational defined benefit 
pension scheme outside of the public sector. Of course, Ireland is 
not alone in facing these challenges and, in fact, the adverse trends 
are somewhat less advanced in Ireland than in other developed 
economies. Accordingly, there is also a rich international literature 
on pension policy, complete with case studies of early 
implementation. Influential studies are World Bank (1994, 2005), 
with wide ranging discussion of the issues presented in, for instance, 
Barr (1998; 2000; 2001; 2002). Case studies of special interest are 
the recent fundamental reforms to the Australian and New Zealand 
pension systems, given their similarities with the Irish system until 
recently. Given the integration of our labour markets, the current 
proposals for pension reform in the UK in the Turner Reports 
(2004; 2005; 2006) and the UK Pensions White Papers (2006a; 
2006b) are of particular interest. Indeed, Ireland, the UK, New 
Zealand and Canada are currently the only developed economies 
where the state pension is designed to alleviate poverty rather than, 
as elsewhere, designed to provide income replacement in retirement.   
It seems we have never been better informed on pensions issues, 
nor so much confused.  Despite the focus on pension policy in 
Ireland over the last couple of years, no consensus had emerged to 
help narrow the range of options in the forthcoming Green Paper. 
The reports of the Pensions Board reflect the conflicting divisions 
of the representatives of the different factors of production in the 
economy, with labour (represented on the Board by the trade union 
movement) broadly supportive of any increase in coverage or 
adequacy of pension, and capital (represented by an employers’ 
association) broadly opposed to any such extension. This could 
reasonably have been anticipated as it has been the perspective of 
the parties consistently over at least the last hundred years (see 
McCashin (2004), Whelan (2006)). The surprise was that the 
representative of the Minister of Finance, and therefore the state, 
did not agree with the aims of pension policy (viewing them as 
more aspirational than firm targets) and generally opposed any 
measure that might increase the cost to be borne by the state. The 
Pensions Board did not achieve a consensus on principles of system 
design or financing, so its recommendations were rather piecemeal 
and unadventurous.  
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Yet a fundamental change in the landscape of pension provision 
in Ireland is upon us. Projections in the Pensions Board (2005) 
assume that the occupational defined benefit scheme outside the 
public sector will dwindle from now providing one-third of the total 
pension coverage in Ireland to nought in 50 years’ time. The Board 
is relying on policies to give further incentives to volunteer defined 
contribution arrangements to both fill the void thus created and go 
on to achieve the stated 70 per cent coverage targets (from the 
current 52 per cent coverage). If a mandatory system is envisaged 
then the Board propose a mix of a defined contribution 
arrangement with an increased level of the flat rate state pension. 
Yet, in terms of the adequacy target to replace 50 per cent of 
income on retirement, the Board (2006, p. 33) admits the superiority 
of the defined benefit design. 
The Board anticipates a fundamental shift in the design of 
pension coverage in Ireland from defined benefit to defined 
contribution.1 Yet there is little discussion on the key differences 
between these designs. Indeed the extensive costings provided in 
Pensions Board (2005, 2006) reports on alternative systems conceal 
the significance of this change by ignoring investment risk and its 
possible consequences and, as such, the figures presented are not 
market-consistent. In this paper, we explicitly take account of 
investment risk at its market price. Quite a different picture emerges 
from this novel approach. Making due allowance for the market 
price of risk more than doubles the cost of pensions presented in 
Pensions Board (2005, 2006) reports. The appropriateness of a risky 
investment strategy for modest and mandated pension savings is 
challenged and, as a key and costless policy action, it is proposed 
that, at a minimum, the state develops and maintains a market in 
index-linked stock to allow pension savers to manage investment 
risk.  
The commitment of the state to maintain a market in index-
linked securities is simply an undertaking that future taxation 
revenues be applied to meet its obligations under the debt 
instruments. This commitment creates a system that is functionally 
almost identical to the PAYG system, under which future taxation 
meets the costs of the future pensions. The two systems are 
contrasted – a system based on compulsory personal pension 
savings in low risk investments and a mandatory pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) approach. It is shown that both systems sustainably deliver 
very similar returns to contributors before administration expenses. 
The PAYG approach is shown to possess a number of theoretical 
1 In fact, the proposal made by the Pensions Board to grant higher rate tax relief to 
employees on pension contributions can be expected to accelerate further the 
demise of private sector defined benefit schemes. Under the proposal, for 
employees on the standard rate of tax, it would be financially more advantageous 
for the employer to cease making provision through a defined benefit scheme and 
increase the salary of employees correspondingly. By so doing, if the employee 
saves the salary increment in a pension arrangement, s/he can be better off (as tax 
relief is at the higher rate) and the employer no worse off (as no employer PRSI 
contributions are levied on the saved increment).  
and practical advantages over the alternative. Materially, when the 
lower administration charges associated with the sustainable PAYG 
system are allowed for, the PAYG system can be expected to 
produce pensions of the order of 20 per cent higher for the same 
contributions than the alternative system. 
Before concluding, we take a brief look at the pension systems in 
the very long term, and the challenges posed by fertility rates below 
replacement. 
 
 
It is often supposed that the costs of production are threefold, 
corresponding to the rewards of labour, enterprise, and accumulation. 
But there is a fourth cost, namely risk; and the reward of risk-bearing 
is one of the heaviest, and perhaps the most avoidable, burden on 
production. 
2. 
Pricing 
Investment 
Risk 
J.M. Keynes, Preface to A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923).  
The essential difference between the defined benefit pension 
scheme and the defined contribution scheme is where the 
investment risk resides. Under the defined contribution scheme, 
investment risk is borne by the pension saver and, on retirement, 
the pensioner. The investment risk is very material, but it does have 
a market price so it can be valued. 
Let us illustrate how to estimate the market price of investment 
risk. Consider a pension saver who wishes to provide a pension of a 
unit of wages at retirement from his 65th birthday until his assumed 
death on his 85th birthday. The present value of such a pension is 
clearly a function of the saver’s current age and the rate of return 
above wage growth his investments earn both prior to and after 
retirement. For simplicity, we assume the same rate of return on 
investments both before and after retirement. Figure 1 outlines the 
present value of such a pension for a person at various ages and for 
various assumed rates of return above wage escalation. 
The graph illustrates well the sensitivity of the present value of 
the ultimate pension to the rate of return above salary growth. As 
developed later in this section, the graph can be used to price 
investment risk for a pension saver. 
Individual pension savers must be amongst the most risk-averse 
savers in the economy. Indeed, the arguments for mandatory 
pension provision become especially convincing only when the lack 
of pension provision at a certain minimum level triggers an 
obligation on society to make good the shortfall. So society’s 
concern is to ensure that everyone has a certain minimum pension. 
Accordingly, national pension policy is primarily concerned with 
those making modest provision, which must be invested in 
securities that promise the most secure pension.2  
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2 Equivalently, if it is argued that such savers can tolerate investment risk then the 
level of compulsory savings is clearly set at too high a level. Those saving more 
than that required to provide the minimum required pension may, of course, 
assume a higher level of investment risk once the probability of achieving the 
minimum pension is not lowered. 
Figure 1: Present Value of a Pension of One Unit of Wages Payable for Twenty Years 
from Age 65 Years, for a Person at Various Ages, as a Function of Investment 
Return above Wage Escalation  
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The minimum pension required by society should be at least 
inflation-linked to maintain purchasing power or, better, wage-
linked, as relative property measures are arguably more appropriate 
in a developed economy. The least-risk investment strategy for such 
savers is to invest in securities the proceeds of which are guaranteed 
to rise in line with inflation (ideally wage inflation but, failing that, 
consumer price inflation). Bonds with proceeds linked to consumer 
price inflation have been issued in many euro economies so by 
comparing the guaranteed real return from these assets with the best 
estimate of the proceeds from more risky assets, an assessment can 
be made of the market value of the risk in the risky asset.  
So the least risk investment strategy – and the most appropriate 
investment strategy for modest pension savers and mandated 
savings – is to invest in index-linked bonds of suitable duration. 
Taking real yields on long-term state guaranteed index-linked bonds 
to be of the order of 2 per cent (consistent with current market 
rates) and real wage escalation to be of the order of 2 per cent per 
annum (which is of the order of wage increases seen over the long-
term past) then the return differential above wage escalation is 0 per 
cent. Consulting Figure 1 a crude approximation to the market price 
of such a pension would be 20 wage units per unit of pension from 
age 65 years (i.e., the saver’s post-retirement life expectancy), 
irrespective of the current age of the saver.   
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Now investing in more risky assets can be expected to increase 
the expected return. Assuming, for instance, a diversified portfolio 
of equities gives a real return of 5 per cent per annum on average 
over the long term then the expected return above wage escalation 
is 3 per cent per annum. Consulting Figure 1 indicates that the 
present value of such a pension is 7.2 units for a 40 year old (with a 
higher value for older persons and lower for younger ones). In our 
example, the market cost of the pension to a 40 year old, assuming 
equity risk, is 7.2; the cost with no risk is 20; so the market cost of 
the investment risk is 12.8. We note the materiality of investment 
risk in this illustrative example: the cost of investment risk is almost 
double the present value of the pension assuming equity risk. Used 
in this manner, Figure 1 gives a rough-and-ready estimate of the 
market value of a pension, assuming different levels of investment 
risk, or, as used in the example, it gives the market price of the 
investment risk assumed. 
The above example was not arbitrarily chosen, but reflects 
assumptions made in the Pensions Board reports (2005, 2006). In 
Table 1, we summarise the real returns, investing expenses and the 
real rate of wage growth in the very long term assumed in the 
Pensions Board (2005, 2006) and highlight the net return above 
wage growth it entails for different investment strategies. 
Table 1: Real Returns, Investing Expenses and Real Wage Escalation, Based on 
Assumptions in Pensions Board Reports (2005, 2006)  
Investment Strategy 
 
Real Return Investing 
Expenses 
Real Salary  
Increase3 
Net Return 
above Salary 
Escalation 
 % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. 
100% Equities 6.00 0.65 2.0 +3.35 
100% Government Bonds 1.75 0.10 2.0 -0.35 
100% Index-linked Bonds 1.75 0.10 2.0 -0.35 
     
75% Equities, 25% Bonds 4.94 0.51 2.0 +2.43 
50% Equities, 50% Bonds 3.88 0.38 2.0 +1.50 
     
100% Equities up to 10 
Years to Retirement then 
100% Bonds 
 
4.50 
 
0.42 
 
2.0 
 
+2.08 
     
 
The costings for the different pension systems in Pensions 
Board (2005, 2006) reports do not allow for the market price of the 
risk assumed. Accordingly, in our earlier example, the cost of the 
pension for a saver investing wholly in equities is put at about 7.2 by 
the method underlying the figures produced by the Pensions Board. 
This is materially different from the market-consistent value of 20, 
which assumes minimal investment risk. 
The detailed figures of the Pension Board reports assume the 
individual pension saver will invest over half in equities on average, 
 
3 Real salary increases are estimated at 3 per cent per annum currently falling to a 
long-run average of 2 per cent per annum from the year 2021. Accordingly, the 
table above somewhat overstates the return above wage escalation up to 2021.  
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and the state, through the National Pensions Reserve Fund will 
invest four-fifths or so in equities (Pensions Board 2005, pp. 215-6). 
By ignoring risk and its possible consequences, the mathematics 
lead to the conclusion that the more risk taken the less one needs to 
save – the complete opposite to the more pertinent logic that the 
more risk undertaken the greater one must save for a certain 
minimum level of pension. In fact the figures provided in the 
reports lead to many anomalies – that pensions are cheapest if 
provided by the state (as the National Pensions Reserve Fund’s 
higher risk tolerance is assumed to produce a real return of 4.6 per 
cent, higher than the 3.6 per cent real return assumed for defined 
contribution arrangements) and that, in fact, the state can turn a 
worthwhile profit by issuing bonds at a 1.75 per cent real return and 
using the proceeds to buy equities with a real return of 5.35 per cent 
per annum. These anomalies are a consequence of taking credit for 
investment risk by assuming higher returns, and not modelling the 
consequences of that investment risk.4  
We propose that the more appropriate value to use is the 
market-consistent value. Aside from placing a considerably higher 
present value on any pension, the market-consistent approach also 
entails dramatically higher contribution rates to provide for a 
pension. Figure 2 graphs the level contribution rate required over a 
working lifetime (assumed to be 40 years up to age 65 years) to 
provide for a pension of half salary from age 65 years at different 
rates of return above wage growth. Again, death is assumed to 
occur on the pensioner’s 85th birthday. 
The marked dependency of the contribution rate on the assumed 
return is evident. Note in particular, that the contribution rate is 25 
per cent of salary per annum to provide a pension of half salary at a 
0 per cent rate of return above wage escalation while at a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4It must be said that the costings in the Pensions Board reports (2005, 2006)  
reflect an approach common in the pensions industry in Ireland, the UK and 
elsewhere. It is difficult to model investment risk satisfactorily (see Appendix) 
whence our adoption of a market-consistent approach to investment risk. Note 
that MacDonald and Cairns (2007) attempt to model explicitly the impact of 
investment risk on retirement behaviour in an economy where each individual 
bears investment risk and has complete discretion of the investment strategy 
pursued. They conclude that “…the unpredictability of the financial markets could 
produce ambiguous and unmanageable retirement ages…” and note that the most 
stable outcome is produced when everyone maintains very high concentrations in 
index-linked bonds.  
Figure 2: Level of Contribution Rate as a Percentage of Salary over Working Life of 40 Years 
to Provide a Pension of Half Salary from Age 65 Years under Various Assumed 
Rates of Return Above Wage Escalation  
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positive 3 per cent differential the contribution rate is 9.9 per cent.5   
Figure 2 also highlights the cost of achieving the national pension 
target of half salary under different return assumptions. If 
investment risk is minimised then the real investment return over 
salary growth is of the order of 0 per cent, pointing to a market-
consistent cost of about one-quarter of salary per annum over the 
entire working lifetime. If, further, an allowance of, say, 1 per cent 
per annum is made for administration costs (see discussion later), 
then the cost of the pension is about one-third salary in each year. If 
such a level of saving appears unrealistic then so too is the national 
pension target. 
The price of the investment risk determined above is sensitive to 
the real returns assumed on different asset classes and to real wage 
escalation.  Appendix I sets out a concise overview of the literature 
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5 A case can be made that public sector pensions, which have a state guarantee like 
index-linked stock, should be valued at 0 per cent in Figure 2 while other 
occupational pensions with largely equity-backed security should be discounted at 3 
per cent to account appropriately for the higher risk. This suggests that the market 
value of public sector pensions is of the order of 25 per cent of salary per annum 
while the equivalent pension from the private sector only about 10 per cent. If a 
true market approach is adopted, this difference of 15 per cent or so per annum 
should be taken into account in ‘benchmarking’ public sector remuneration against 
that of the private sector.  
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in this area and provides data from the markets that broadly support 
the figures in Table 1. The Appendix also discusses the considerable 
uncertainty surrounding the expected return from risky assets, 
especially in the context of those targeting a preset pension. It is the 
considerable uncertainty in the performance of risky assets over 
both the long and short term that leads to such high rewards for 
risk bearers. In short, we cannot build a durable pension system on 
the shaky and unreliable foundation that is provided by the expected 
returns from risky assets. 
The above considerations, centring on investment risk and its 
market price, lead to a rather simple policy recommendation: the 
state should issue and maintain a broad and liquid market in index-
linked bonds with maturities up to 60 years. The recommendation 
imposes no cost on the state, as the conversion of current 
outstanding nominal bonds to index-linked bonds will be done at 
market rates. Yet the simple innovation gives pension savers 
instruments to reduce significantly the risk in pension saving and, by 
so doing, gives transparency to the ultimate pension (a key 
characteristic of the defined benefit plan). Such instruments provide 
a valuable safeguard against the mis-selling of investment risk to the 
risk-averse pension saver. For mandatory savings, the presumed 
need to provide for a minimum level of pension entails that 
investment risk be eschewed so investment in index-linked 
securities should be mandatory.6 Indeed, as developed in the next 
section, the insight that compulsory pension savings should be 
invested in index-linked state guaranteed stock leads on to a greater 
insight that produces a more efficient method to provide minimum 
pensions. 
The above recommendation echoes calls for an index-linked 
bond issuance policy to help manage pension liabilities by, amongst 
others, Healy (1996), Fitzgerald (2005), recent petitions from leading 
industry-wide pension schemes and from professional bodies such 
as the Society of Actuaries in Ireland. Other mechanisms to transfer risk 
away from the pension saver have been made by Kehoe (2003); 
IAPF (2005); Whelan (2005a, 2006), but the simple market-based 
approach of issuing index-linked gilts has the considerable merit 
that it is costless and straightforward to implement. 
We conclude this section by summarising. The defined benefit 
scheme design is ideal from the perspective of the pension saver as 
it shifts investment risk and gives transparency to the quantum of 
pension ultimately payable. Defined contribution arrangements can 
achieve these key benefits if there is a broad and liquid market in 
index-linked bonds. The state, at negligible cost, can maintain a 
market in index-linked bonds. The simple innovation of an index-
6 Some have suggested the state guarantee a minimum return on compulsory 
retirement accounts. This suggestion is incompatible with investment freedom as 
the guarantee is a put option for the investor, the value of which is increased by 
following a more risky investment strategy. In short, the presence of such a 
guarantee encourages risk-taking by investors at the cost of the state. The logic for 
compulsory saving leads, as outlined in the text, to controls on the investment 
freedom permitted.  
linked market in Ireland will enable pension savers to provide low 
risk pensions for themselves. However, if compulsory savings in 
defined contribution arrangements is proposed (as outlined in 
Pensions Board (2006) report) then investment in such state 
guaranteed index-linked stock should be mandatory to provide for a 
minimum pension. This later conclusion points to an even better 
design of a compulsory pension savings scheme, as developed 
below. 
 
 To allow retirement in an economy, the retired must have claims 
over current production to facilitate their consumption when not 
themselves producing. The claim over current production can be 
organised in two ways: via the financial markets or via the state 
through the so-called ‘social contract’, which requires that the 
working generation contribute on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis to 
the retired generation. The financial contract route is pre-funded, as 
the pension provider builds up a portfolio of financial claims. The 
PAYG approach is often identified with an unfunded approach. 
The Pensions Board (2005) is equivocal on whether to pre-fund or 
not, arguing “…the difference between funding and PAYG is only a 
different means of organising the future transfer of assets…. The 
difference between funding and PAYG is the difference between 
the uncertainty of future asset values and the uncertainty of future 
taxation” (p. 57). The report fails to discuss the issue further simply 
noting that “the economic theory of funding versus PAYG is quite 
involved and its relevance to the assignment in hand is 
questionable” (ibid. p.184).  
3. 
Financing 
Pensions: to 
Fund or Not to 
Fund? 
Let us consider a little deeper the simple policy recommendation 
above that the state maintain a market in index-linked securities, 
sufficiently broad and deep to allow pension savers to monitor and 
manage investment risk. Such a commitment is simply an 
undertaking by the state that future taxation revenues be applied to 
meet its obligations under the debt instruments. This commitment 
creates a system that is functionally almost identical to the PAYG 
system, under which future taxation meets the costs of the social 
obligation. The key differences between the contrasting system – 
defined contribution arrangements investing in government 
guaranteed index-linked stock or a PAYG scheme – may 
conveniently be discussed under two main headings: pricing or 
value-for-money and administration. 
 
 In capital markets, the price of index-linked stock, like any other 
financial asset, is set by supply and demand in the context of the 
price of all other capital market securities. The extensive Appendix 
I, shows that, on average over the long term, a real return of about 2 
per cent per annum or so has been delivered on reasonably low risk 
investments. With wages growing in real terms by about 2 per cent 
per annum on average over the long term, this gives a long- term 
return above wage escalation of approximately 0 per cent per 
4. 
Pricing or 
Value-For-
Money 
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annum. It is of primary concern to the contributors of any PAYG 
system that it can deliver comparable returns. 
The mathematics underlying the PAYG approach gives a very 
neat answer to the return sustainably deliverable under such a 
system (anticipated in Samuelson (1958)).  For sustainability, we 
must consider an idealised stationary population, where the number 
of workers entering in any year equals the number of deaths. 
Consider such a stationary population with workers contributing a 
fixed percentage of wages and total contributions divided as pension 
payments to the retired population. Viewed from the perspective of 
an individual, the internal rate of return from such a system is 
calculated by solving the equation of value that puts the present 
value of contributions paid over a working lifetime (discounted at 
the required rate of return i equal to the present value of the 
pension from retirement (discounted at the same rate of return, i. 
Intuitively, the contributor will get out everything he puts in (by the 
stationary assumption) and, as each calendar year passes, the 
increase will be in line with the increase in wages. This leads us to 
speculate that the rate of return, i, will be the same as the rate of 
wage escalation. This insight turns out to be true (see endnote†). In 
short, in a stationary population, the PAYG system of financing 
delivers a return comparable to the expected return on a low risk 
portfolio of assets. Indeed, the PAYG system is somewhat superior 
in several respects, in that: (i) the return to contributors is explicitly 
linked to wage escalation, a linkage that no existing capital security 
gives but is ideal to maintain relative income levels in an economy; 
(ii) the rate of return is applied to future as well as current 
contributions, a guarantee that is impractical to synthesize through 
the capital markets; and (iii) it ensures that the ultimate pension is 
not dependent on the performance of the markets, the investment 
policy pursued by the individual, the solvency of financial 
institutions, or other factors that could conspire to frustrate the 
objectives of pension policy. In place of all these risks, it substitutes 
the single risk that the social contract will be honoured by future 
generations. 
The above result only applies to stationary working populations. 
The working population in Ireland is not stationary but has been 
growing rapidly of late. The internal return to the retired in a strictly 
operated PAYG system when the workforce is growing is above the 
weighted average growth of wages in the economy as there is an 
excess of contributors. This extraordinary value for money was 
remarked upon by Paul Samuelson7: “…the beauty of social 
insurance is that it is actuarially unsound. Everyone who reaches 
retirement age is given benefit privileges that far exceed anything he 
has paid in… A growing nation is the greatest Ponzi game ever 
contrived”. However, such enhanced returns are only sustainable if 
the working population grows indefinitely. Rather than pay out such 
enhanced pensions, a better approach is for the state to invest the 
surplus contributions. This would not only ensure intergenerational 
7 As quoted in “Snares and Delusions”, The Economist, 14 February 2002. 
equity (as all contributors get the same return) but also the financial 
sustainability of the system, as the surplus funds would be invested 
in global capital assets which, according to reasonable expectations, 
would produce a return from a low risk investment portfolio of the 
order of wage escalation. These surplus funds could then be drawn 
upon when future contributors are below the number required to 
support the retired in a stationary population.8 
 
 The two contrasting systems – defined contribution arrangements 
investing in index-linked stock or the sustainable PAYG scheme 
with an element of pre-funding – might also differ in their 
administration. The PAYG system would be run by a single entity 
(the state, as at present, or an organisation the state appoints) while 
the other is generally envisaged to work in a free but regulated 
market, with many provident institutions competing for market 
share. Arguments as to which model is preferable centre on the 
perceived better service and greater innovation in the competitive 
market model against the economies of scale a monopoly provider 
can achieve. The issue of quality of service versus cost of service is a 
debate that cannot be resolved neatly.  
5. 
Administration 
Mahon (2005) gives an overview of the issues, a survey of the 
literature and a case study of economies of scale within Irish 
occupational pension schemes. He shows that small schemes have 
costs a multiple of times higher than large schemes per member. 
Such costs can best be expressed as a ‘reduction in yield’ (RIY) for 
our purposes and Mahon (2005) estimates the costs so expressed to 
vary from over 3 per cent of assets per annum for small schemes to 
about 0.3 per cent per annum for larger schemes. These costs are 
very material in the context of investment returns of the same order 
of magnitude and, with the aid of Figures 1 and 2, we can estimate 
the impact of such costs on the ultimate pension. Table 2 illustrates 
the magnitude of the reduction in pension as a function of 
administration costs pre-retirement and the investment return 
before administration costs (but after expenses of investment). 
Table 2 shows, for instance, that factoring in administration 
costs of 1 per cent per annum in the accumulation phase, reduces 
the ultimate pension by between 18 per cent to 21 per cent per 
annum (as the assumed investment return increases from 0 per cent 
to 4 per cent per annum). In fact, it is clear from Table 2 that the 
reduction in pension is highly sensitive to the assumed 
administration costs but the reduction is not particularly sensitive to 
the investment return assumed. A rule-of-thumb can summarise the 
import of Table 2: extra administration costs of 0.5 per cent per annum in 
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8 Of course, the state might adopt a more aggressive investment strategy, as 
currently pursued by the National Pension Reserve Fund. The essential point, 
though, is that the state guarantees returns to contributors and charges for those 
guarantees at a rate consistent with long-term market rates.  
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the accumulation phase will reduce the ultimate pension by about 10 per cent per 
annum.  
Table 2: Percentage Reduction of Ultimate Pension Due to Impact 
of Administration Costs in the Accumulation Phase 
(expressed as reduction in yield), as a Function of the 
Investment Return above Wage Escalation in the 
Accumulation Phase 
Administration 
Costs (RIY) 
Investment Return above Wage Escalation in 
Accumulation Phase 
(before administration costs) 
% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 
      
2.00 31 33 34 36 37 
1.75 28 30 31 32 33 
1.50 25 26 27 29 30 
1.25 21 23 24 25 25 
1.00 18 19 19 20 21 
0.75 14 14 15 16 16 
0.50 9 10 10 11 11 
0.25 5 5 5 6 6 
0.00 0 0 0 0 0 
Assumptions: Pension is payable for 20 years from age 65 years, increasing in line 
with wage increases. Net investment return in retirement (decumulation phase) is 0 
per cent above wage escalation. Once off administration charge of 3 per cent of 
assets on retirement. Accumulation period 40 years to age 65 years. 
 
Turner (2004, Appendix C) includes a discussion of the costs of 
different administration structures and puts explicit administration 
costs at 0.3 per cent of assets for occupational schemes and 0.8 per 
cent for personal pensions. The administration costs assumed by 
Turner (2004) are probably below what an Irish pension saver 
would have to pay. The Pensions Board (2005, pp. 226-7) estimates 
that administration costs on personal accounts to be of the order of 
1.3 per cent to 1.5 per cent per annum pre-retirement and, on 
retirement, a once-off charge of 3 per cent of assets is assumed.  
The conclusion is that economies of scale are material in pension 
provision. According to estimates in the Pensions Board (2005) 
report, extra charges associated with maintaining individual 
retirement accounts are of the order of 1 per cent to 1.2 per cent 
per annum (that is 1.3 per cent-1.5 per cent less the 0.3 per cent 
RIY of a monopoly provider). Assuming extra charges of 1 per cent 
per annum, the associated reduction in pension is of the order of 20 
per cent. Murthi et al. (1999) gives empirical support to this 
assessment, estimating that pensions are reduced by one-quarter due 
to costs associated with operating individual retirement accounts in 
the UK (both investment and administration). 
The above estimates assume that there is no change in the 
pension provider over the entire accumulation phase of four 
decades. If pension providers are changed then costs increase 
further. Murthi et al. (1999) reports that the costs of switching from 
one provider of individual retirement accounts to another (or 
ceasing contributions with one and starting with another) will 
reduce the ultimate pension by approximately a further 15 per cent. 
Extra charges of this magnitude inhibit movement between 
providers, so reducing competition in the market. 
We conclude that extra charges associated with individual 
retirement accounts will reduce the ultimate pension by about one-
fifth. Since, from our earlier discussion, the pension contracts types 
are standard, offering guaranteed proceeds, it is difficult to envisage 
how service can justify the significant financial impact of the loss of 
economies of scale identified above. 
 
 There are details to be worked out in the operations of the 
envisaged PAYG system, stabilised by pre-funding. Yet the 
principle underpinning the system design is value-for-money for 
contributors – that is, contributors get a return on their 
contributions equivalent to the market return on low risk 
investments. Details that require consideration include formalising 
the social contract so that it becomes more akin to a financial 
contract. This entails ensuring that contributions will remain a fixed 
percentage of wages and that contributions give an enforceable 
entitlement to a corresponding pension, the pension to increase in 
line with the weighted average wage growth in the economy. It is 
necessary to specify how the system will be modified if life 
expectancies change (see, for instance, Turner (2006) for some 
interesting suggestions) and specify how the system will treat 
persons who help achieve ‘the common good’ but are not in paid 
employment.  The greatest challenge is, though, how to invest such 
commitments by the state with credibility. As envisaged above, the 
system is sustainable and self-financing so there is no reason why an 
organisation at arms-length from the state cannot operate the 
system. This would entail removing political discretion from state 
pensions, a particular challenge given its historic importance to Irish 
politics (see Ó Gráda, 2002).  
6. 
Key Principle 
of Design 
 
 Whether based on financial or social contracts, it is necessary that 
there is a sufficiently large working population to support the rest of 
the population under any pension system. The projections of the 
Central Statistics Office, CSO (2004), which were used in the 
costings of alternative pension systems, assumes that fertility rates in 
Ireland will fall below replacement rate to between 1.7 and 2.0 over 
the foreseeable future, with a medium assumption of 1.85. Unless 
immigration is maintained at a high level, this projection puts 
pressure on the sustainability of any pension system in the very long 
term. 
7. 
Sustainability 
in the Very 
Long Term 
Fertility rates below the replacement level of approximately 2.1 
are commonplace not only in developed economies but also in 
more developing ones, as highlighted in Figure 3. In particular the 
fertility rates of EU-15 countries are amongst the lowest in the 
world and the new accession countries have even lower fertility 
rates (e.g., Poland and Slovenia at 1.25). In most regions of the 
world, as the map makes clear, the population is not replacing itself.  
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Figure 3: Map of Estimates of Total Fertility Rates, 2006 
 
Sources: The World Factbook 2006, Central Intelligence Agency. Map sourced from Wikipedia under GNU Free 
Documentation License. 
 
The low fertility rates across the world have a direct impact on 
Ireland. First, it can be anticipated that there will be downward 
pressure on the future returns from capital markets caused by 
weaker demand from the smaller future working (and saving) 
generations. The size of the impact is less easy to forecast but 
modelling done by, inter alia, Miles (1999; Brooks (2000); Turner 
(2003); and Miles and Černý (2006) are suggestive that a fall in the 
long-term return of ½ per cent per annum can be expected. This 
shades downwards the estimates based on long run historic 
statistics. Second, fertility and migration policy are intimately linked 
to pensions policy in the long term. In particular, the state might 
encourage higher fertility. One policy option, compatible with the 
PAYG system, is to give an increment of pension for each child 
reared.9 Equally, pension policy might encompass policies aimed at 
making Ireland more attractive to immigrant workers than other 
competing economies. To encourage immigration further might 
require some radical initiatives and, in the fullness of time, require a 
rebalancing in the relative taxation of capital and labour when 
labour replaces capital as the scarce and mobile factor of 
production. These considerations are obviously longer term (longer 
than the 50 year projections in the Pensions Board (2005, 2006)) 
reports but must be borne in mind and inform pension policy. 
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9 Such a policy also helps ensure that parents’ limited resources are directly 
invested in the development of the next generation, and not otherwise directed to 
pension saving. 
This paper attempts to identify some principles that might help 
guide the design and financing of pension provision in Ireland for 
the twenty-first century. We focus on the key difference between 
the two design templates of defined benefit and defined 
contribution, namely, who bears the investment risk. The price of 
investment risk is assessed on a market-consistent basis and its 
order of magnitude shown to be material.  
8. 
Conclusion 
It is argued that individual pension savers of modest means or 
those mandated to save must be considered risk-averse. A proposal 
is made that the state issue market instruments, at market price, to 
help these savers manage investment risk. This is represented as a 
costless innovation that significantly furthers the overall aims of 
national pension policy. For mandated pension savings designed to 
provide a minimum pension, investment in low risk instruments 
should be compulsory. The identification of state guaranteed index-
linked bonds of suitable duration as the low investments allows us 
to identify a more efficient method of providing minimum pensions 
than through personal retirement accounts.   
A sustainable PAYG system is contrasted with compulsory 
pension savings in low risk investments. Ignoring administration 
costs, the two systems are seen to be very similar and deliver very 
similar value-for-money for contributors. The PAYG system was 
seen to have some second-order advantages. Factoring in 
administration costs tilts the balance in favour of the PAYG system 
as it can deliver better value for money through economies of scale. 
Of course, the framework for compulsory pension provision in 
Ireland has been a PAYG system for almost a hundred years. This 
system needs to be refined in two ways. First, it requires an element 
of pre-funding to ensure that it is sustainable in the long term. 
Second, the social contract it represents needs to be better defined 
so it more closely approximates a financial contract with, in 
particular, greater clarity on the rights of contributors and 
beneficiaries. 
In conclusion, the argument developed in the paper is against 
the introduction of special retirement savings accounts suggested in 
Pensions Board (2006) report. Figures presented show that, for the 
same level of contributions, such accounts will lead to pensions 
lower by at least 10 per cent, and probably closer to 20 per cent, 
than those delivered by the alternative sustainable PAYG system 
proposed.   
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APPENDIX I: 
ESTIMATING THE 
REAL LONG-TERM 
RATE OF RETURN ON 
RISKY ASSETS 
Risky investments, by definition, deliver uncertain payoffs. Yet for 
several important purposes it is necessary to have an estimate, with 
some appreciation for its accuracy, of the long-term average payoff 
from a diversified portfolio of risky assets. Such purposes include 
(a) informing the individual’s decision on whether to consume or 
save, (b) estimating the amount to save for a given targeted sum or 
pension and (c) evaluating the opportunity costs incurred by 
following a less risky or matching strategy. Estimating the 
magnitude of the return from a diversified portfolio of risky assets 
is thus a fundamental problem in an economy. In turn, the risk 
premium demanded by investors from time to time gives valuable 
information on the outlook for the economy. 
A.I 
Introduction 
If the portfolio of risky assets is limited to include only equities 
listed on recognised exchanges we find a considerable literature 
devoted to the problem. The term ‘equity risk premium’ (ERP) has 
been coined to denote the expected additional return from a 
diversified portfolio of equities over a riskless investment. The 
riskless investment has been variously taken to be cash instruments, 
such as short-term Treasury bills or, to provide a better match for 
the term of the equity investment, returns on gilt-edged stock of 
long maturity.  
Welch (2000, 2001), amongst others, shows that estimates of the 
future long-term equity risk premium tend to be anchored in the 
long term ex post ERP, despite arguments that the historic ERP 
appears too high to be considered solely as a premium for risk-
taking (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Knowledge of the historic ERP 
recorded in different economies, with different growth trajectories, 
can give valuable insights into estimating the future ERP.   
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Capital markets in the modern form are relatively recent 
innovations. Homer and Sylla (1996) give a comprehensive 
overview of the historical evolution of interest rates, tracing them 
back five millennia and documenting their level through every major 
economy in modern times. Homer and Sylla (1996) and Homer 
(1997) make a persuasive case that modern long and short-term 
interest rate markets can be traced no further back than Holland of 
the seventeenth century and England from the eighteenth century. 
The Dutch developed the notion of a national debt, funded from 
the taxation revenues of a stable and dependable system of 
government. The Dutch system of finance migrated to England 
with King William of Orange, and from England was spread to 
Ireland, America, and elsewhere. Accordingly, we can date the 
beginning of modern fixed interest markets from about 1700. 
A.II 
History of 
Modern 
Capital 
Markets 
The history of long-term interest rates in modern times is 
summarised in Figure I.1, which traces long-term interest rates of 
almost the entire western world every year from 1700, with 
particular emphasis on those currencies to which Ireland’s is or has 
been pegged. Specifically, the graph shows sovereign long bond 
yields from 1700 in the UK, from 1746 in France, from 1798 in the 
US, from (what was to become) Germany since 1815, and from 
Italy since 1861.  
Figure I.1: Annual Long Bond Yields, 1700-2002  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
17
00
17
12
17
24
17
36
17
48
17
60
17
72
17
84
17
96
18
08
18
20
18
32
18
44
18
56
18
68
18
80
18
92
19
04
19
16
19
28
19
40
19
52
19
64
19
76
19
88
Britain France Germany Italy USA
Sources of Data:  A History of Interest Rates, Homer, S. & R. Sylla, Rutgers University Press, 1996; Sylla, R. 
website; Global Financial Data website; British Historical Statistics, Mitchell, B.R., Cambridge University 
Press, 1988. Note that the real return on gilts over the entire period since 1700 was 3.1 per cent in the 
UK and 3.4 per cent in US (Source: Global Financial Data). 
 
 
 
 
 
 72
Modern equity markets have an even shorter history. Scott 
(1912) details the establishment and development of the first limited 
liability companies in these isles, but the development of extensive 
markets in such shares was disrupted by the Bubble Act of 1720, 
which required an Act of Parliament to confer limited liability. 
While the Bubble Act did not apply in Ireland, it did hamper 
developments. It was not until legislative developments in the 
middle of the nineteenth century (particularly the Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1856) that limited liability became more widely 
availed of in the UK (including Ireland). Thomas (1986, p.144) 
recounts that, outside of the banking sector, there was just 47 
companies in Ireland with limited liability in September 1944 (of 
which 10 were listed on Irish stock exchanges) and this number was 
swelled by more than 2,500 incorporations over the second half of 
the nineteenth century.  
 
 The documented history of returns from equity markets prior to 
the twentieth, including the Irish markets, is as yet patchy (but for 
the markets in these isles, see Gayer et al. (1940), Grossman (2002) 
and the on-going project of Charles Hickson and John Turner of 
Queen’s University, Belfast). However, the returns from 1900 are 
now well documented. The real returns in each calendar year from 
each major market in Ireland from 1900 are summarised in 
graphical form in Figure I.2.  
A.III 
Investment 
Returns 
Figure I.2: Annual Real Returns from Irish Equity, Bond, and Cash Markets,  
1900-2002 
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Sources: See Whelan (2004). This source also gives details of returns above wage escalation in Ireland. 
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The return from each market over the 101 years to end 2000 is 
summarised below and compared with the returns from other 
national markets. 
Table I.1: Annualised Real Returns on Ireland and Major Markets, 101 Years Ending 31 
December 2000 
Country Equity Bonds Cash Inflation 
 % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. % p.a. 
Ireland 4.7 1.0 0.7 4.5 
     
UK 5.8 1.3 1.0 4.1 
US 6.7 1.6 0.9 3.2 
Japan 4.5 -1.6 -2.0 7.6 
Netherlands 5.8 1.1 0.7 3.0 
Germany 3.6 -2.2 -0.6 5.1 
France 3.8 -1.0 -3.3 7.9 
Italy 2.7 -2.2 -4.1 9.1 
Spain 3.6 1.2 0.4 6.1 
Sources: For Ireland see Whelan (2004), otherwise figures taken from Tables 4-1 and 5-1 in Dimson et al. 
(2002). Figures for Germany exclude the two-year hyperinflationary period of 1922-23. If this 
episode was included then German inflation would go up to an annualised rate of about 34 per 
cent, cash returns fall to –19 per cent real per annum bond returns to –8.5 per cent, and 
equities to 4.5 per cent real per annum (Dimson et al., 2000). 
 
The returns from the Irish capital markets mirror that from 
other national markets. Inflation was roughly in line with 
international averages; equities considerably outperformed the two 
other asset classes and by roughly the same margin; bonds and cash 
struggled to keep ahead of inflation and posted similar modest real 
returns.  
 
 Investment risk is often measured as simply the standard deviation 
of the nominal or real return. Taken as the standard deviation of 
real returns, such a measure would put the investment risk of the 
Irish equity, long bond and cash markets at about 25 per cent, 12.5 
per cent, and 5 per cent respectively (see Whelan, 2002).  However, 
these popular risk measures are not appropriate to the pension saver 
whose risk relates to the uncertainty of the future pension, not to 
the uncertainty of the current value of the sums saved. Defining risk 
in terms of the targeted pension produces materially different, and 
generally higher, measures of investment risk. Whelan (2004) 
provides a detailed analysis and measurement of investment risk by 
assessing the variability of the ultimate pension under different 
investment strategies. The measure depends on, inter alia, the age of 
the pension saver. However, over a wide range of ages, the 
investment risk under this more appropriate definition is of a higher 
order of magnitude than the conventional measure and bears out 
our intuition in ranking cash as the highest risk for those targeting a 
predefined pension, followed by conventional bonds and equities. 
In particular, duration mismatch in bonds is shown to be of equal 
or sometimes even greater significance than equity risk. Finally, it is 
shown that index-linked bonds of suitable duration are the lowest 
risk investment for an index-linked pension. 
A.IV 
Investment 
Risk 
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The relatively paucity of data from the capital markets’ short 
history give little support to the often expressed view that 
investment risk from equities reduces as the time period of 
investment increases (the so-called ‘time diversification of risk’). In 
any event, such an effect, if present, is not so sufficiently 
pronounced as to be relied upon by risk averse pension savers. 
Examples may be cited of long periods where the cumulative real 
returns from equities were negative, such as the world equity market 
in the first two decades of the twentieth century, such as the French 
and German equity markets over a period of more than 50 years 
(1900-1952 and 1900-1954 respectively), or such as the cumulative 
decline of 41 per cent in real terms of the Japanese equity market 
over the 1990s (see Dimson, Marsh et al. (2006), especially p.31). 
 
 The obvious approach to estimating the future equity risk 
premium (ERP) is to measure it historically and use this as a best 
estimate. Derrig and Orr (2004) provide a detailed overview of 
methods used to forecast the ERP in the much-studied US market. 
Many of the methods used simple averages or, more generally, 
assume that the returns are generated from a stationary stochastic 
process. But the empirical studies surveyed in Whelan (2005b) 
demonstrate that this assumption is not valid. In short, the risk of 
risky assets tends to change over time and thus the ERP, as a 
compensation for risk borne, can be expected to vary with time. 
Figure I.2 highlights the non-stationary of the returns delivered by 
the Irish equity market over the twentieth century.  Accordingly, 
forecasting the equity risk premium must be done in tandem with 
forecasting the expected course of the riskiness of the market. This 
compounds the problem as we are uncertain of the future riskiness 
of risky assets. 
A.V 
Estimating the 
Equity Risk 
Premium 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) argue that the historical equity risk 
premium appears too large to be attributed solely as a premium for 
risk bearing, as such an attribution leads to risk aversion parameters 
that appear implausibly high. Other factors, such as borrowing 
constraints after the Second World War and the form of taxation, 
have been used to account for some of the observed excess return 
(McGrattan and Prescott, 2001). In so far as these latter factors are 
unlikely to operate to the same extent in the future then the ERP, as 
a pure premium for risk-bearing, must be lower than it has been 
observed in the past. 
Welch (2000) surveyed 226 academic financial economists 
between late 1997 and early 1999 and reports that estimates of the 
ERP (30-year arithmetic average relative to either 30-year bonds or 
short-term bills10) varied between 1.5 per cent and 15 per cent, with 
a mean of 7.1 per cent, and a median of 7.0 per cent. Of special 
interest is the subgroup of 17 academics that published at least one 
paper on the equity risk premium or aggregate stock returns. These 
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10 This pools the results of two different surveys of nearly equal numbers. The first 
asked the ERP relative to the 30-year bond and the second asked the ERP relative 
to short-term bills.  Coincidently, the average of the responses was almost the 
same for both groups. 
experts estimate the 30-year ERP somewhat lower, the average of 
this subgroup being 6.5 per cent.  
The respondents were mostly US based and it appears that they 
anchored their estimate about the historical averages based on the 
well documented experience of the US equity market in the period 
1926 to mid-1990s. Indeed, Welch provides evidence that the 
financial economists believed the consensus of other financial 
economists’ would be somewhat higher than their own (by about 
0.5 per cent) and that they appear to shade lower their estimate 
relative to their perceived consensus view. Welch (2001) updated 
the survey and reports that the same ERP estimate has now fallen to 
about 5 per cent to 5.5 per cent, even when the results were limited 
to that subset of the whole 510 respondents who had participated in 
the original survey. To summarise it appears that estimates of the 
long-term ERP are (a) anchored in long term historical averages, (b) 
shaded downwards slightly, and (c) the estimates are surprisingly 
sensitive to short-term returns on the market. 
Other authors, such as Shiller (2000, 2002); Thaler (2002); 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) challenge the assumption that investors 
behave rationally and attempt to account for the equity risk 
premium (and other apparent anomalies in markets) in terms of 
cultural, psychological, or structural factors. Thaler (2002), for 
instance, argues that investors suffer from ‘myopic loss aversion’, 
where they tend to be overly influenced by their recent market 
experiences and, in particular, place too great an emphasis on short-
term losses.11  
 
 There is an unhelpfully wide range of estimates for the ERP, even 
amongst academics publishing in the field. All the methods, whether 
by a formal statistical projection or a less formal adjustment of past 
returns to exclude episodes unlikely to recur, are anchored to 
greater or lesser extent on the ERP observed in the past.  
A.VI 
Conclusion 
Based on our summary of the long-term returns delivered by 
Irish and international capital markets, it would not be unreasonable 
to assume the following real (geometric) returns for the long-term 
future, not allowing for management and other expenses:  
Diversified equity portfolio:    3-5%  
Index-linked and nominal long bonds:  1-3%  
Cash:  ½%-1½% 
The above estimates are subject to the qualification that the 
returns from such risky assets will not be as expected. No doubt, 
this qualification is why the markets so generously reward the risk 
bearer as, as yet, there is no satisfactory model for investment risk. 
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11 Whatever about investors, Thaler’s thesis does account for the financial 
economists’ dramatic revision of the long term ERP between Welch (2000) and 
Welch (2001). 
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ENDNOTE 
† In standard actuarial notation, if r is the retirement age and x the 
age when contributions start then we have, 
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Now, as suspected, i=0 per cent is clearly a solution. This solution 
can be seen to be unique for reasonable r by considering the 
derivative with respect to i of both sides. The import of this is that 
the internal rate of return to contributors in a stationary and 
sustainable PAYG system is equal to the weighted average rate of 
wage growth of contributors. 
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